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The location of economic activity both across and within countries has undergone dramatic shifts over
the last five decades. Three key trends stand out. First, cross-country inequality has declined as many
developing countries have grown rapidly. Second, economic geography within countries has instead grown
more unequal in both the developed and the developing world. Third, within-country spatial disparities have
grown mainly because of the disproportionate success of skilled cities. In this paper, I develop a model that
jointly explains these patterns as a consequence of deepening international economic integration. My model
explains the faster population and output growth of skilled cities, as well as their tendency to increase their
initial skill advantage. Consistent with the evidence, my theory predicts a non-monotonic path of urban
growth in developed countries. The model predicts a future shift in worldwide urban hierarchies as some
developing-world cities overtake unskilled cities in industrialized countries along global supply chains.
JEL classification: F1, O1, R1
Keywords: globalization, urbanization, urban growth, skilled cities
∗I would like to thank Giacomo Ponzetto, Vasco Carvalho, Gino Gancia and Jaume Ventura for guidance and encouragement. I
am also grateful for their helpful comments to the editor and two anonymous referees; to Gene Ambrocio, Oriol Anguera, Francesco
Amodio, Alessandra Bonfiglioli, Bruno Caprettini, Jonathan Dingel, Julian di Giovanni, Andrea Matranga, Mrdjan Mladjan, Tom
Schmitz, Tetyana Surovtseva; and to seminar participants at the CREI International Lunch, EDP Jamboree, Barcelona GSE
PhD Jamboree, UPF Student Seminar, LSE Summer Seminar, PhD Conference on International Development (University of East
Anglia), Urban Economics Association (9th meeting, Washington DC) and SAEe 2014. All remaining errors are my own. The
author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. This paper has
previously been circulated under the title “Globalization and the Smart City”.
1
1 Introduction
Economic geography has changed dramatically over the last five decades, both across and within countries.
Rapid export-led growth in many developing countries, particularly China and India, has led to a more dis-
persed cross-country economic geography. By contrast, within-country economic geography has instead grown
more unequal1. In developed countries such as the US, economic convergence across regions has stopped and
may have even reversed. Urban success has been uneven: some cities experienced rapid growth while others
suffered stagnation or even decline. Spatial disparities have also widened in developing countries where eco-
nomic growth propelled the rise of superstar cities but left many areas almost untouched.
Human capital has emerged as a key determinant of diverging urban fortunes. Skilled cities have outper-
formed their skill-scarce counterparts on most measures of urban growth, including population growth and real
estate appreciation (Glaeser 1994; Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer 1995; Simon and Nardinelli 1996,2002;
Black and Henderson 1999; Glaeser and Saiz 2004; Shapiro 2006; De la Garza 2008; Liao 2010).2 These skilled
locations have also widened their skill advantage over recent decades, leading to skill polarization across space
(Berry and Glaeser 2005). This link between human capital and urban success has been documented for rich
and poor countries alike (Anderson and Ge 2004; Da Mata et al. 2007; Queiroz and Golgher 2008).3
What has caused this reconfiguration of economic geography both across and within countries? This paper
advances the hypothesis that the reshaping of global supply chains brought about by deepening globalization
can jointly explain these observed patterns. I develop a model in which the reduction of international trade
costs allows middle-skill activities (such as advanced manufacturing, product testing etc.) to be increasingly
separated from high-skill functions (such as management, R&D or other advanced services). As a result, middle
skill activities are increasingly outsourced to low-wage countries while high-skill functions remain the preserve
of developed countries4. This reshaping of global value chains can account for the rapid economic growth of
developing countries like China and India, the decline of the US rust belt, the resurgence and continued success
of leading cities like New York and London, and the rise of superstar cities in the developing world5.
My model features a simple geography. There are two countries, North (N) and South (S). Each country has
a population of ex-ante identical workers who can choose to acquire skills. Workers cannot move across coun-
tries, but they are perfectly mobile within their country. Each country consists of two cities and a non-urban
hinterland. All locations are characterized and by their Ricardian productivity, which in the case of cities is
interpreted as urban infrastructure. Cities are also characterized by their endowments of scarce urban land.
The hinterlands are fully specialized in a traditional unskilled sector. Cities host instead three other activities:
1Moretti (2012) calls this phenomenon “The Great Divergence”
2The relationship between human capital and local productivity and economic success is explored at length in Moretti (2004,2013).
3As is standard in the literature, here and elsewhere I use the concept of skilled cities to mean urban areas with a (relatively) high
fraction of their populations exceeding a certain threshold of skill or education level.
4The main mechanism highlighted by the model places this paper in the wider literature on offshoring (McLaren 2000; Grossman
and Helpman 2002, 2004, 2005; Antras 2003; Antras and Helpman 2004; Antras, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg 2006) and global
supply chains (Feenstra and Hanson 1996; Jones and Kierzkowski 1990, 2001; Deardoff 2001a, 2001b; Kohler 2004; Fujita and
Thisse 2006; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 2008; Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud 2014)
5By relating the elimination of spatial frictions to trade to the evolution of within country economic geography this paper contributes
to the strand of literature analyzing the impact of international trade integration on intra-country economic geography (Krugman
and Livas Elizondo 1996; Paluzie 2001; Monfort and Nicolini 2001; Behrens, Gaigne, Ottaviano and Thisse 2006a, 2006b, 2007,
2009)
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unskilled manufacturing, skilled manufacturing, and management services. These activities are simultaneously
ranked by increasing skill intensity, decreasing land intensity, and increasing reliance on urban infrastructure.
Management plays the pivotal role in shaping global value chains. It has three key properties. First, it
is concentrated in a single Northern city because it is subject to strong agglomeration economies and a wide
North-South productivity gap. Second, it serves as an intermediate input for the other urban activities, and is
more important for skilled than for unskilled manufacturing. Third, it is costly to deliver across countries. The
cost of international trade in management services declines with improvements in information and communica-
tion technology, such as the advent of cell phones, the internet and email. With this decline in communication
costs as its single driving force, my model matches qualitatively the main features of the evolution of global
economic geography over the last four decades.
Starting with prohibitive communication costs, the model reproduces the economic geography of the middle
of the twentieth century. The wealthy North has successful and differentiated cities while the lagging South has
small and undifferentiated cities. Management clusters in only one city which becomes the North’s skilled city.
High communication costs force skilled manufacturing to co-locate with management in the North. Southern
cities fully specialize in unskilled manufacturing which accounts for only a small share of the urban value chain.
As communication costs decline, the Southern city with better infrastructure becomes competitive in skilled
manufacturing and gradually captures market share in this activity. The re-location of skilled manufacturing
from North to South induces income convergence between the two countries. It also increases the average skill
intensity of the activity mix in both countries. This increase in the demand for skill is met by endogenous skill
acquisition. The leading city in each country, which has a comparative advantage in the more skilled activ-
ity, grows both in absolute terms and relative to its less skilled counterpart. This differential growth induces
economic divergence across cities within each country. Skilled cities concentrate an increasing share of their
countries’population and output.
Moreover, as the growing skill intensive sectors locate disproportionately in each country’s leading city, these
cities become increasingly specialized in their country’s most skilled activity and disproportionately attract
skilled workers. This increasing specialization induces intra-national skill polarization across cities. Finally, as
the spatial reallocation of the urban supply chain reduces the cost of urban output relative to the traditional
good produced in the hinterlands, elastic final demand implies that the worldwide urban sector grows relative to
the traditional one. This growth pattern accounts for the worldwide advance of urbanization driven primarily
by the South.6
In addition to matching the motivating facts, my model reproduces the non-monotonic path followed by
skilled cities in many developed countries, with stagnation or even decline followed by rapid urban resurgence
(Glaeser and Ponzetto 2010). The model can also be used to anticipate the effects of further reductions in
spatial frictions across countries. In particular, a fall in communication costs below a critical threshold may
6The structural transformation mechanism embedded in my model is conceptually closest to studies analyzing urbanization and
structural transformation in the context of open economies (Glaeser 2013, Fajgelbaum and Redding 2014, Jedwab 2014). This
feature of the model also places the current paper in the wider literatures on urbanization (Kim 2000; Kim and Margo 2004;
Michaels, Redding and Rauch 2011, 2012, 2013) and structural transformation (Baumol 1967; Ngai and Pissarides 2007; Rogerson
2008; Gollin, Parente and Rogerson 2002, Matsuyama 1992).
3
lead to “urban overtaking” along the global supply chain. In this scenario, the skilled city in the South obtains
a more skill intensive industrial composition than the unskilled city in the North, and also surpasses its land
valuations. This novel theoretical result already seems relevant for the most successful developing world cities
and highlights a mechanism that helps explain the recent phenomenon of “reshoring”.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly reviews the evidence that documents
the motivating facts. Section 3 outlines the model and presents the main results. Section 4 presents a more
detailed account of the recent “history of the location of economic activity” as seen through the lens of the
model. Section 5 concludes.
2 Reviewing the Facts
This paper aims to explain the following stylized facts, in a unified framework that permits the study of devel-
opments in both industrialized and developing nations: (1) in recent decades cross-country economic geography
has experienced some rebalancing as a group of developing countries has grown rapidly and caught up with
industrialized countries; (2) world urbanization has increased sharply, mainly driven by unprecedented rates of
urbanization in the developing world; (3) within countries, economic activity has instead become more concen-
trated as cities with higher endowments of human capital have performed better along most measures of urban
success, including population growth, employment growth, income growth and real estate price appreciation;
(4) also within countries, a phenomenon of skill polarization across space has been documented, as skilled
cities have augmented their skill advantage over their skill scarce counterparts. In this section, I review the
supporting evidence for these facts.
Panel a of Figure 1 illustrates our first stylized fact. In the last five decades, rapid growth in some large
developing countries (primarily China and India, but also Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey and Vietnam)
has led to a reduction of global income inequality. This has occurred in spite of an increase in inequality within
countries and even in the face of disappointing growth performance in other poor countries (Sala-i-Martin 2006).
In turn, this development has had a profound implication for the spatial distribution of economic activity across
countries. A simple reading of international GDP statistics serves as a compelling illustration of this fact. As
recently as 1992, the advanced group of industrialized economies within the G20 represented almost 60% of
world GDP at PPP, whilst the group of emerging economies within the same club represented 20% of world
GDP. By 2014, the group of advanced economies within the G20 accounted for only 46% of world GDP at PPP,
while the share of the G20 emerging economies had increased to 36%7.
The reconfiguration of cross-country economic geography has been accompanied by a process of rapid urban-
ization, which has led to increasing concerns about issues such as sustainability and the emergence of excessive
concentrations of population. Panel b of Figure 1 illustrates this development. If in 1960 only 33.6% of the
world’s population lived in cities, by 2010 a majority of the world’s population (51.5%) resided in urban ar-
eas. The shift towards urban living was particularly strong in less developed countries, which increased their
7Reported data based on the IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database.
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urbanization rate from 23.6% to 46% over this period. The scale of this phenomenon has led some analysts
to conclude that some of the mechanics of the urbanization process have changed, as many nations are now
able to sustain high levels of urbanization at lower levels of income than was typical in the past (Glaeser 2013).
This view is also supported by the weakening of the traditional links between urbanization on one hand and
industrialization (Gollin, Jedwab and Vollrath 2015) and growth (Jedwab and Vollrath 2015) on the other.
Nevertheless, urbanization also continued in the world’s advanced regions, where the proportion of population
living in cities increased from 64% to 80% over the last half a century.
Against this backdrop of cross-country economic convergence, recent decades have also witnessed widening
spatial disparities within countries. This trend has been particularly salient at the urban level, where growth
performance has been highly heterogeneous8. Interestingly, the diverging fortunes of cities seem to have been
partially driven by a growing association between human capital and urban success. This has been reflected
in two related developments affecting both developed and developing countries: skilled cities have displayed
superior performance across a battery of measures of urban growth and they have also augmented their skill
advantage over time, a phenomenon described as “skill polarization across space”. I illustrate these two trends,
which form the object of my final two stylized facts of interest, for the case of the US and China in Figure 2.
Panels a and b of Figure 2 document the faster population growth of skilled cities in these two countries in
the last decade of the twentieth century, while panels c and d document the phenomenon of skill polarization
across space over the same period.
The fact that local human capital endowments have been a strong predictor of urban growth over recent
decades in both rich and poor countries has been extensively documented in the literature. Analyzing a large
sample of US metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) over the period 1980 to 2000, Glaeser and Saiz (2004) find
that a 1 percentage point increase in the share of a city’s adult population with a bachelor’s degree is associated
with an increase in the decadal population growth rate by about half of one percent. In a similar study, Shapiro
(2006) finds that over the period 1940 to 1990 a 10% increase in a metropolitan area’s concentration of college
educated residents was associated with a 0.8% increase in subsequent employment growth. Glaeser, Ponzetto
and Tobio (2012) also confirm the link between skills and regional growth for US counties over the last two
centuries, though the correlation seems to break down for parts of the nineteenth century. Similarly, a long-run
study of UK cities undertaken by Simon and Nardinelli (1996) finds a robust connection between initial human
capital endowments and subsequent city growth for a period spanning over a century. For the case of developing
countries, Da Mata et al. (2007) analyze a large sample of Brazilian cities and find that an increase by one year
in the average number of years of schooling at the city level is associated with a 5.6% increase in the decadal
population growth rate.
Similarly, the phenomenon of skill polarization accross space benefits from substantial empirical support.
In an analysis of the evolution of skill shares across a sample of more than three hundred US metropolitan
areas over the period 1990 to 2000, Berry and Glaeser (2005) find that a one percentage point increase in the
8For example, for the case of the US, Glaeser and Ponzetto (2010) document that while San Francisco and Chicago have added
substantially to their populations in the period spanning 1970 to 2010 (17% and 13% respectively), Detroit has lost more than
20% of its population in the same period.
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proportion of city’s population holding a bachelors degree in 1990 is associated with a 0.13 percentage point
increase in the growth of the city’s skill share over the next decade. Comparable results have been found by
Poelhekke (2013) for the case of Germany and by Queiroz and Golgher (2008) for Brazil.
3 Model
3.1 Basic Setup
The model describes the process through which the reduction of cross country spatial frictions leads to the
reallocation of economic activity across and within countries and explains the recent changes in the configuration
of economic geography. I interpret these spatial frictions as (international) communication costs that decline
with improvements in information and communication technology, such as the advent of cell phones, the internet
and email9. While this decline in communication costs is the single driving force of globalization in my model,
other potential drivers of globalization (such as international financial integration, cross-country technological
diffusion or reductions in trade costs due to trade liberalization) could be modeled in the same way and have
similar implications for global value chains and for economic geography.
I consider a set-up with a simple geography: a world economy featuring two countries, labeled North (N) and
South (S). Each country contains two urban locations (or cities) and a hinterland or countryside. The cities are
indexed N1 and N2 in the North and S1 and S2 in the South. Cities are described by their endowments of land
which I denote by N cn and by their location specific Ricardian productivity, which I interpret as infrastructure
and denote by Acn
10. For simplicity I assume that all urban locations in both North and South have an identical
endowment of land NS1 = NS2 = NN1 = NN2 = N . Land is owned by absentee landlords.
Countries have exogeneously given populations of ex ante identical workers LN and LS . As is standard in
the international trade and economic geography literatures, I assume that workers are immobile internationally,
but are costlessly mobile across locations within countries. Workers in both countries have a unit endowment of
time and have access to an educational technology that allows them to acquire skills at the expense of fraction
e < 1 of their time11.
Two consumption goods are produced in the world economy: a traditional good, indexed as good 1, which
is produced in the hinterland, and an urban good, which is indexed as good 2. The delivery of the urban
good requires the completion of multiple production stages: unskilled manufacturing, skilled manufacturing,
and management (or management services). These production stages have a natural ranking by skill intensity,
with management being the most skill intensive activity in the world economy. All commodities (i.e. both final
goods and intermediates or production stages) in the world economy are produced under conditions of perfect
9This is line with several strands of literature that have attributed phenomena as diverse as the changing patterns of economic
specialization across US cities (Duranton and Puga 2005), the reorganization of cross-country teams (Antras and Garicano 2006)
and the changing nature of international trade (Baldwin 2016) to improvements in communication technologies.
10In my setting, infrastructure may reflect both history determined investments in roads, rail or other types of productivity
enhancing immobile capital as well as “first-nature” factors (i.e. natural advantage) such as proximity to the coast or to major
rivers.
11Importantly, the educational technology is assumed to be identical across countries.
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competition.12
The organization and spatial configuration of global value chains is critically shaped by management. This
is because this activity has three main distinguishing characteristics. First, management is the only activity
subject to agglomeration economies, which are assumed to have the nature of localization economies. In keeping
with empirical evidence, this assumption captures the fact that skill intensive activities are typically subject
to stronger agglomeration economies than more basic ones13. Thus, the production of management involves
combining land and labor via the technology:


















where c and n index countries and cities respectively, L denotes unskilled labor, H denotes skilled labor, N
denotes urban land while α, β, µ′ and ρ are parameters, with α, β, µ′ < 1 and ρ > 1. Localization economies
are formalized by the productivity shifter φ(M
cn
M ) with the property that φ
′(.) > 014. In essence, a city’s
productivity in delivering management services is a function of its global market share in the management
sector.
Second, management is the only commodity that is subject to spatial frictions, represented in our setting
by international communication costs15. Management services face negligible communication costs within
countries, but substantial such costs when delivered internationally. Communication costs take the standard
iceberg form: τ > 1 units of the management services need to be shipped from a location within country c
for one unit of such services to be delivered to a city within country c′. By contrast, all other commodities
are assumed to be costlessly tradable both within and across countries. This set of assumptions captures the
declining importance of physical transportation costs for goods and services relative to the costs of transporting
ideas and people (Glaeser and Kohlhase 2004) as well as the fact that persistently high costs of transferring
knowledge and ideas are more consequential for interactive, skill- and idea-intensive activities (Glaeser and
Ponzetto 2010, Michaels, Rauch, Redding 2013).
Third, management does not enter the production of the urban good directly, but as an input in the skilled
manufacturing stage of production. This assumption captures the intuition that more sophisticated production
stages typically require greater managerial attention than more basic production activities. For example,
manufacturing workers in the apparel sector require less managerial input than product designers, while in
the software industry programmers require more contact with software developers and project managers than
12These production stages can be reinterpreted as intermediate goods, so that I sometimes refer to the production stages as
intermediates.
13The assumption that skill intensive activities are subject to stronger agglomeration economies is standard in the literature
(Glaeser and Ponzetto 2010) and benefits from empirical support (Henderson 1983, Nakamura 1985, Henderson et al. 1995,
Dumais et al. 2002, Alonso-Villar, Chamorro-Rivas and Gonzalez Cerdeira 2004).
14A framework employing urbanization economies generated by human capital would generate similar results to the present
framework but would be more algebraically cumbersome. Moreover, the empirical literature in urban economics finds stronger
evidence in favor of localization economies than urbanization economies. See for instance Nakamura (1985), Henderson (1986),
Rosenthal and Strange (2004), Henderson (2003).
15I interpret communication costs as any costs related to managing or providing advanced services to a plant located remotely.
They could include the opportunity cost of time incurred when middle or top managers have to visit faraway plants, or the






















where c and n index country and city respectively, and the requirement that management is the most skill
intensive activity in the world economy implies that µ < µ′. Moreover, the production of urban goods also








The production processes for the urban intermediates described above embed two important features. The
first concerns the factor intensity of the various urban activities. Along the value chain of the urban good
more skill intensive production stages are also less land intensive. This assumption is standard in the urban
economics literature and is in line with empirical observations: Glaeser and Ponzetto (2010) employ the same
assumption while Wood and Berge (1994) and Owens and Wood (1995) note that “Primary production is
usually both more land-intensive and less skill intensive than manufacturing”.
The second important feature concerns the role of infrastructure in production. In particular, infrastructure
has a greater impact on output in the more skill-intensive production stages. This is because a given endowment
of A units of infrastructure in a particular location enhances the productivity of unskilled workers in that
location by a factor of A, but augments the productivity of skilled workers by a larger Aρ (where ρ > 1). As a
consequence, cities with high endowments of local infrastructure are particularly attractive for activities, such
as management and skilled manufacturing, that make intensive use of skilled labor.
The urban good is assembled from the unskilled manufacturing intermediate and the skilled manufacturing
intermediate via the production process:
q2 = u
θs1−θ (4)
where u denotes unskilled manufacturing and s denotes skilled manufacturing. In line with empirical observation
we assume that the more skill intensive stage of production of the urban good contributes disproportionally to
its value by setting θ < 12 (Moretti 2013)
16.
Finally, production of the traditional good takes place in countries’ hinterlands and employs unskilled




where ξ1c denotes the productivity with which the traditional good is produced in country c ∈ {N,S}.
On the demand side of the model, the preferences of the representative consumer (worker or landowner) are
16Analyzing the often discussed case of the iPhone, Moretti(2013) notes:“The iPhone is made up of 634 components. The value
created in Shenzen is very low, because assembly can be done anywhere in the world[...]The majority of the iPhone’s value come
from the original idea, its unique engineering, and its beautiful industrial design.”
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Workers choose their location, occupation and consumption to maximize utility. In line with our description
of production technologies and geography, they face three career-location options: to remain in the hinterland
and work in the traditional sector, to move to an urban location within their country and work as an unskilled
worker in the urban sector, or to acquire skills and move to an urban location to work as a skilled worker
in the urban sector. Crucially, we require that the elasticity of substitution between the two final goods in
consumption is greater than unity (i.e. ε > 1), which means that producers of each good face elastic demand.
3.2 Equilibrium Definitions
With the set-up above, an equilibrium of the world economy can be defined as follows:




























N , rS1, rS2, rN1, rN2
〉
and a collection of commodity prices prices 〈p1, pu, ps, pM 〉 such that:
• consumers are maximizing utility by their choice of location, occupation and consumption
• firms in all sectors - unskilled manufacturing (u), skilled manufacturing (s) and management services
(M) - are maximizing profits by their choice of location and input mix
• labor markets clear at each location for each type of labor
• land markets clear at the city level
• markets for all goods and intermediates, including management services clear at the level of the world
economy.
External effects (localization economies) generate the possibility of multiple equilibria17. I deal with this
issue following the standard approach in economic geography. I define a concept of equilibrium stability and
focus my analysis on stable equilibria. Intuitively, a world equilibrium is stable if it is robust to a locational
deviation by a small but positive mass of management services providers. As management is the only activity
subject to external economies, it is the only source of multiple equilibria. My definition of equilibrium stability
is stated more formally below:
Definition 2. A (world) equilibrium is stable if it tends to be restored after a small set of management services
producers is moved exogenously from one location to another. A deviation is “small” if the cumulative market
17Multiple equilibria are a standard feature in modern economic geography models. For example, while the presence of (sufficiently
strong) localization economies tends to favor the agglomeration of the management services production in only one urban location,
there always exists symmetric equilibria in which multiple cities host an equal fraction of the management services sector. For
a brief discussion of this issue see Krugman (1998).
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share of the deviating firms is not sufficient to reverse or tie the ranking by market share in management of
any pair of urban locations .
3.3 Parameter Restrictions
To match empirically relevant configurations of economic geography I impose additional parametric restrictions
on the set-up described above. These are outlined as Assumptions 1 to 5 below18. Taken together, they generate
four key features of the economic environment.
First, I require that the North takes on the role of the high wage country and displays a comparative advan-
tage in the most skill intensive activity, management. This is implemented via the following two assumptions:
Assumption 1 - North- South Wage Gap - Northern productivity in the traditional sector is higher than
that of the South (ξ1N > ξ1S), and the traditional sector is sufficiently large (i.e. γ is sufficiently large) such
that in any equilibrium the traditional good is produced in both countries.
Assumption 2 - Comparative Advantage in Management - Management services can only be produced
in the North.
Assumption 1 guarantees that the relative wages between the two countries are fixed by their relative
productivity in the traditional sector. Moreover, since we assume that the North is more productive in this
activity, it becomes the high wage country in our setting. Importantly, the location of urban activities and the
(changing) patterns of comparative advantage in the urban sector have no bearing on the relative wages of the
two countries. This approach to fixing relative wages between countries ensures the tractability of our analysis
and is widely used in the international trade literature (see Antras and Helpman 2004).
Assumption 2 gives the North an overwhelming comparative advantage in the production of management.
This admittedly stark assumption aims to capture the fact that while developing economies have recently di-
versified into increasingly complex activities, the most sophisticated stages of global value chains (such as the
high-level management of large multinationals, but also complex finance and technology functions) have largely
remained the preserve of rich nations.
Second, I require that the localization economies are sufficiently strong to ensure the clustering of this ac-
tivity in only one urban location:
Assumption 3 - Agglomeration Economies and the Clustering of Management - Localization economies
in management are sufficiently strong (φ(.) is sufficiently convex) that any stable equilibrium features the clus-
tering of management in only one urban location.
Given my earlier assumptions about cross-country comparative advantage in management, Assumption 3
guarantees that any stable equilibrium features the complete clustering of the management sector in one of the
North’s cities. This assumption aims to parsimoniously capture the empirical observation that the most skill
intensive activities along global value chains have traditionally concentrated in a small number of successful
locations within rich nations.
18The formal statements of the parametric restrictions are provided in Appendix A. A brief discussion of the robustness of the
model’s predictions to relaxing some of these restrictions is provided in Appendix C.
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Third, I assume that infrastructure plays a crucial role in the delivery of skilled manufacturing and that
infrastructure endowments are heterogeneous in the South. Infrastructure is typically relatively abundant in
rich nations but is scarce in many parts of the developing world. Moreover, it can be a significant driver of
spatial disparities within developing nations, as cities and regions with more developed infrastructure (or better
market access) are often able to undertake high value added activities while lagging locations within the same
countries are precluded from doing so. To capture this feature of observed economic geography I assume:
Assumption 4 - Infrastructure Heterogeneity and the Role of Infrastructure in Production -
Northern locations have high and homogenous endowments of infrastructure given by AN1 = AN2 = A > 1.
By contrast the South displays heterogeneous infrastructure endowments: an advanced city (which we assume
to be S2) has abundant infrastructure comparable to that of Northern locations AS2 = A > 1 while the other
Southern location is characterized by a low infrastructure endowment AS1 = 1. Moreover, the role of infras-
tructure in skilled manufacturing is sufficiently important (i.e. ρ is sufficiently large) such that the lagging
Southern city can never be a lowest cost location for the completion of skilled manufacturing.
Finally, as the model aims to analyze the implications of globalization for the distribution of economic activ-
ity across space, I require that the presence of international communication costs imposes a binding constraint
on the production possibilities of the South. I thus impose the following restriction:
Assumption 5 - Communication Costs and Comparative Advantage - The North-South wage gap
is sufficiently large (i.e. ξ1N/ξ1S is sufficiently large) such that in the absence of communication costs some
Southern locations have a comparative advantage in the completion of skilled manufacturing 19.
The assumption above guarantees that changes in communication costs have the potential to shift the pat-
terns of comparative advantage and lead to the reallocation of economic activity across space. This is because
in the absence of communication costs some Southern locations are posited to be competitive in skilled man-
ufacturing, while the presence of high communication costs can reverse this pattern of comparative advantage
in favor of the North by raising the Southern price of a crucial input for skilled manufacturing - management.
3.4 Spatial Equilibrium and Main Results
With the above restrictions in place, the model can account for some of the key facts that characterize the
evolution of global economic geography in the last five decades. In this section I outline the main predictions
of the model and relate them to the stylized facts that motivate the paper. In the next section I present a more
detailed, stage by stage account of the history of the location of economic activity as seen through the lens of
the model.
With perfectly competitive markets for all commodities, spatial equilibrium requires that all activities in
19Two versions of this assumption (denoted Assumptions 5a and 5b) are maintained during different parts of our analysis, with one
being more restrictive. The less restrictive Assumption 5a is sufficient for the results reported in this section, while in section 4
the more restrictive Assumption 5b is maintained. For more details see Appendix A.
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the world economy take place at cost minimizing locations:
pi = min
l
cl(i) ∀i ∈ {1, u, s,M} (7)
where l indexes locations (i.e. the hinterlands of the two countries and cities S1, S2, N1, N2). Communication




where τ represents international communication costs. The prices of all other commodities are identical both
across and within countries.
Regarding factor prices, perfect mobility guarantees that wages are equalized across locations within coun-
tries for workers of the same skill level. Assumption 1 fixes the level of unskilled wages in both North and
South:
wUc = ξ1cp1 c ∈ {N,S} (9)
Furthermore, access to educational technologies that allow workers to acquire skills fixes the equilibrium
skill premia in both countries. As these educational technologies are assumed to be identical across countries





Equation (10) clarifies an important feature of the model: factor proportions play no role in determining the
patterns of comparative advantage across countries. As workers are (ex-ante) identical and skill acquisition is
endogenous the price of skill in both countries is solely determined by their respective education technologies.
Moreover, as these education technologies are assumed to be the same across countries, the relative price of
skill also plays no role in determining the location of economic activity across countries. In effect, the only
determinants of economic geography in my framework are Ricardian productivity differences (described in
Assumptions 1 to 5) and the existence of spatial frictions (communication costs).
Moving to urban land markets, rental rates in each city are pinned down in equilibrium by the condition
rlN̄ = (1− β)Y lu + (1− β)(1− µ)Y ls + (1− β)(1− µ′)Y lM (11)
The income of landowners at each urban location is thus given by the land rental expenditures of the economic
activities housed by each city (Y li denotes the value of output of commodity i produced at location l). Further-

























With these preliminaries in place, we are ready to study the effect of improvements in long-distance com-
munication, reflected in the decline of τ , on the spatial configuration of economic activity. We are particularly
interested in changes in cities’ populations, skill shares and real estate prices, as well as in urbanization.
I begin by considering the case of prohibitively high communication costs affecting the international delivery
of management services. This setting represents the world economy in the middle of the twentieth century,
when containerization and other technological developments had already lowered the costs of shipping goods
over long distances, but communication costs remained high and multinationals were rare. Proposition 1 offers
a snapshot of economic geography under these circumstances.20
Proposition 1. There is a threshold of communication costs Tmax such that if
τ > Tmax
there is a unique stable equilibrium. Both Southern cities are specialized in unskilled manufacturing (u). One
Northern city (N1) is fully specialized in skilled manufacturing (s). The other (N2) provides both skilled
manufacturing and management services (M). In the South, the more advanced city S2 is larger (PopS2 >
PopS1), has greater output (YS2 > YS1) and higher land prices (rS2 > rS1). In the North, the city where





S1 S2 N1 N2
u u s s,M
Figure 3: World before communication-induced integration
When communication costs are very high, skilled manufacturing is uneconomical to produce in the South
. This is because it requires management as an essential input, which in turn is very costly to source from
the North and infeasible to produce in the South (Assumption 2). As a result, the equilibrium features a
relatively poor South whose cities are completely specialized in unskilled manufacturing, and a richer North
that undertakes both skilled manufacturing and management. Southern cities are relatively undifferentiated,
displaying the same skill share and industrial structure. However, the more advanced city in the South, S2,
has a higher population and more expensive urban land than its counterpart S1 due to its greater endowment
of infrastructure.
20All proofs are in Appendix B.
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In the North, the clustering of management in only one urban location, N2, endogenously gives rise to
cities that are differentiated in terms of both their industrial structure and their skill share21. N2 becomes the
North’s skilled city, while N1, which becomes fully specialized in skilled manufacturing (s), takes on the role
of the relatively unskilled Northern city. Due to the lower land to labor ratio in the management sector, N2
has a larger population than its less skilled counterpart. However, given that Northern cities are identical in
terms of both exogenous infrastructure and access to management, and that the sector that is on the locational
margin between the two Northern cities is skilled manufacturing (s), the two cities of the North have the same
rental rates for urban land.
In what follows, I explore the implications of gradually removing communication costs associated with the
international delivery of management. Proposition 2 summarizes the model’s predictions for urbanization and
the cross-country distribution of economic activity:
Proposition 2. Along the path defined by unique stable equilibria and for any 1 < τ ≤ Tmax, as communication
costs decline the world economy grows, urbanization increases and the compensation of Southern factors relative
to factors in the North weakly increases. Moreover, there is a threshold τ∗ ≥ 1 such that for τ∗ < τ ≤ Tmax, as
communication costs decline, the aggregate compensation of Southern factors of production relative to Northern
factors strictly increases.22
As communication costs decline below a critical threshold (Tmax), the patterns of comparative advantage
begin to shift. The South becomes competitive in skilled manufacturing and captures market share in this
activity. This allows the world economy to operate at higher levels of efficiency, as a friction is reduced and
economic geography moves closer to a configuration determined solely by (unconstrained) comparative advan-
tage. As a result, world output increases.
With skilled manufacturing increasingly undertaken in the South, the price of intermediate s and of the
overall urban good fall relative to the price of the traditional good. Intuitively, this is because falling communi-
cation costs gradually remove a friction that affects the production of the urban good but not of the traditional
one. Moreover, given elastic demand for the urban good, this results in an increase in the expenditure share of
the urban good, and conversely a decline in the expenditure share of the traditional good. This movement in
the relative expenditure shares of the two sectors (urban and rural) is reflected in their relative wage bills, and
also in their relative employment levels. This entails a rise in the share of city dwellers as a proportion of total
world population, or , in other words, an increase in urbanization.
Proposition 2 also predicts convergence in total output (or GNP) between North and South. Under As-
sumption 1, the relative wages and hence the relative aggregate wage bills of the two countries are fixed by
their relative productivity in the traditional sector. However, as communication costs fall, a larger fraction
of urban production takes place in the South and Southern urban landowners increase their share in overall
21The assumption that N2 is the location that captures the entire management sector is without loss of generality. The equilibria
described are unique up to a permutation of Northern city labels.
22For some values of the model’s parameters, there exists a threshold of communication costs τ∗ below which further improvements
in communication leave the compensation of Southern factors relative to Northern factors unchanged. This occurs because below
this threshold, the possibilities for geographic reallocation of economic activity are extinguished.
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land receipts. As a result, the overall compensation of Southern factors grows relative to that of the North.
Finally, as worldwide urbanization increases and the South increases its weight in urban production, the size
of the Southern urban system increases. Given that countries have constant populations, this implies that the
urbanization rate of the South also increases.
The shifts in the location of economic activity caused by declining international communication costs affect
not only the cross country distribution of income and urbanization, but also the relative size of cities within
countries.
Proposition 3. Along the path defined by unique stable equilibria, for any τ∗ < τ ≤ Tmax, a reduction in τ is

















Proposition 2 revealed that as communication costs decline the South captures a larger fraction of the value
chain for the urban good, and begins a process of catch-up relative to the North. This catch-up process does
not proceed evenly, however. Due to its high infrastructure endowment, the advanced Southern city S2 benefits
from the gradual relocation of skilled manufacturing from the North. By contrast, the lagging Southern location
is precluded from gaining market share in this activity by its comparatively poor infrastructure. Thus, given
the high employment density of skilled manufacturing, S2 displays more robust population growth than its
lagging (and now relatively skill scarce) counterpart S1, causing the relative size of Southern cities to move in
the direction described by Proposition 3.
The implications of this gradual relocation of skilled manufacturing from North to South are also not
symmetric for locations in the North. As the South becomes increasingly competitive in intermediate s, both
Northern locations gradually shed skilled manufacturing activities and their affiliated jobs. However, whereas
N1 benefits from no compensating force against this loss of market share in skilled production, this is not the
case for N2. A fall in communication costs is associated not only with skilled production relocating to the South,
but also with an increase in the overall size of the urban sector. Thus, while the North-South reallocation of
activity negatively impacts both Northern cities, the management cluster in city N2 stands to benefit from the
lowering of communication frictions, as it can now sell its product to a larger and more efficient world economy.
This growth of management services then serves to cushion the negative impact of skilled manufacturing
relocation for city N2 in the early stages of globalization and eventually allows for N2 to grow even in the
face of substantial offshoring to the South. This ensures more robust population growth performance for the
skilled Northern city along the entire path of international economic integration, leading to divergence in urban
success in the North. Furthermore, this mechanism proposed by the model to account for spatial divergence
in the North, that ties the relative success of skilled cities to their specialization in management and other
activities that benefit from internationalization, is consistent with empirical evidence. In Appendix D I provide
some suggestive evidence that initial specialization in management (and other activities that can be classified
as “international commerce”) is associated with economic success across US cities in recent decades.
Finally, I present the model’s implications for the spatial distribution of workers by skill and the evolution
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of land prices across locations.
Proposition 4. Along the path defined by unique stable equilibria, for any τ∗ < τ ≤ Tmax, a reduction in τ is
associated with skill divergence across cities and/or divergence in the price of land across cities in each country.































with at least one inequality in each pair (14) or (15) above being strict.
As communication costs decline, the spatial economy goes through a number of stages, which the next
section discusses in greater detail. Within each country, two configurations are typical. The less skilled city
may fully specialize in the country’s less skill intensive sector (u in the South and s in the North), while the
more skilled city hosts both the same sector and the more skill intensive one (s in the South and M in the
North). Otherwise, both cities in each country may fully specialize in different sectors (u for S1, s for S2 and
N1, M for N2).
When the first type of configuration prevails, a reduction in communication costs increases the skill share
differential between cities within countries but keeps the land price differential unchanged. This is because
falling communication costs make the most skilled sector in each country grow. As a result, some of the less
skill intensive activities in the country’s skilled city relocate, leaving the advanced location with a greater
exposure to the most skill intensive sector, and thus with a higher skill share. On the other hand, in this type
of configuration, small reductions in communication costs have no impact on the sectoral composition of the
lagging city, and thus leave that location’s skill share unchanged. Increasing skill shares in advanced locations
coupled with stagnating ones in lagging cities lead to skill polarization across space. Moreover, when the skilled
city has a mixed industrial composition, the relative land rents between urban locations within the country are
fixed by the less skilled sector, which is on the locational margin between the two cities, and are thus invariant
to small changes in communication costs.
On the other hand, when both cities within a country are fully specialized, growth in the more skilled sector
as communication technologies improve only translates into relative growth of the more skilled city, as the
lagging cities never become competitive in their respective country’s most skilled activity (this is guaranteed by
Assumptions 3 and 4). As the relative weight of the skilled city in a country’s value added grows and no further
activity migrates out of the skilled city, this advanced location will experience congestion and an increase in
real estate prices relative to the backward city.
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4 A History of the Location of Economic Activity
In this section I complement the general results of the previous section with a detailed, stage by stage analysis
of the evolution of the spatial economy in a world of improving communications. I first focus on the past and
discuss how the model explains the recent shifts in global economic geography. I then turn to the future and
present the model’s predictions regarding the future impact of continuing globalization.
To provide a parsimonious characterization of the predictions of the model and avoid the proliferation of
sub-cases, in this section I impose an additional parameter restriction. This is a technical “timing” assumption
that fixes the sequencing of the full specialization moments of the two countries’ advanced cities along the path
of international economic integration. I describe this restriction in greater detail below:
Assumption 6 - Timing of Full Specialization - The expenditure share of skilled manufacturing (s) is
sufficiently large relative to that of unskilled manufacturing (i.e. θ is sufficiently small) such that the skilled
Southern city fully specializes in skilled manufacturing “before ”(i.e. at higher levels of communication costs)
the skilled Northern city fully specializes in management.
As globalization proceeds, the skilled city of the South tends to capture market share in skilled manufacturing
and shed market share in unskilled manufacturing. Equally, in the North, the skilled city gradually loses market
share in skilled manufacturing and becomes increasingly specialized in management. Assumption 6 ensures that
as this process unfolds, full specialization (in skilled manufacturing) takes place first in the South’s advanced
city. This assumption has modest implications for the qualitative predictions of the model and is made for ease
of exposition23.
4.1 The Globalization of Skilled Manufacturing
With this additional restriction in place24, I proceed to interpret the recent shifts in economic geography
through the lens of the model. I begin my account from the spatial configuration outlined in Proposition 1,
which arguably describes the state of affairs in the middle of the twentieth century: relatively concentrated eco-
nomic activity across countries; stark differences between the internal economic geographies of countries, with
industrialized nations featuring high levels of urbanization and notable concentration of economic activity while
the economic geography of developing countries remains more dispersed; relatively low levels of geographical
segregation of the skilled in both North and South coupled with small within country disparities in the price
of land.
The first stage of globalization begins when international communication costs fall below the threshold at
which skill-intensive manufacturing becomes economical to undertake in the South25. The implications of this
23For lower values of the expenditure share of s, N2 would attain specialization before S2. As a result, in the second stage of
globalization the model would predict skill divergence across Southern cities and land price divergence across Northern cities
24Aside from the additional parametric restriction outlined in Assumption 6, the analysis in this section also maintains the more
restrictive version of Assumption 5 (denoted Assumption 5b). See Appendix A for formal statements of these restrictions.
25The re-location of skilled manufacturing from North to South could occur in two ways that are equivalent from the perspective
of the model: the entry of domestic Southern firms into new activities; or offshoring by Northern firms. The latter mechanism
is easier to document, as it associated with an observable trail of FDI: FDI flows to a greater extent to the more skilled regions
of developing countries (Nunnenkamp 2002), affiliates of foreign entities are more skill intensive than domestic firms (Feenstra
and Hanson 1997), and FDI flows are self-perpetuating (Head, Ries and Svenson 1995, O’Huallachain and Reid 1997, Smith and
Florida 1994). Moreover, FDI flows seem to have a significant impact on local economic success (Wei 1999). Some evidence also
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first stage of globalization for the configuration of the spatial economy are outlined below:
Stage 1: The Globalization of Skilled Manufacturing Along the interval of communication costs given
by Tspec1 < τ ≤ Tmax the equilibrium configuration of economic activity across space is depicted in Figure 4
Skilled manufacturing (s) takes place in locations {S2, N1, N2}, unskilled manufacturing (u) in both Southern
cities while management services (M) in N2 26. Along this interval, any reduction in communication costs
is associated with increased urbanization and worldwide GDP, faster increases in Southern GDP, growth in
the relative size of advanced cities (S2 and N2) in both countries, and skill polarization across space within
countries.
S1 S2 N1 N2
u u,s s s,M
Figure 4: First Stage of Globalization
As the first stage of globalization unfolds, location S2 leverages its high infrastructure endowment to become
competitive in skilled manufacturing and take on the role of the South’s skilled city. As a result, city S2 gains
market share in skilled manufacturing while unskilled manufacturing is crowded out and aids the growth of
city S1. The higher employment density of skilled manufacturing guarantees that population growth in city
S2 is faster than in S1, leading to the “take-off”of this location relative to the rest of the country. Moreover,
the shift of skilled manufacturing to the South is still limited enough that the relatively unskilled activities
of each country (u in the South, s in the North) remain the main consumers of urban land and the main
drivers of urban land prices. As a result, land rental rate differentials display little change within countries.
The margin of adjustment to sectoral reallocation across space is the industrial composition and skill shares
of cities, as highlighted in proposition 4. Consequently, in this early stage of globalization, the model predicts
skill polarization across cities within countries.
While Proposition 3 establishes the relative performance of Northern cities, the evolution of the absolute
size of Northern cities is ambiguous during this stage of globalization. Northern locations are subject to two
competing forces. On the one hand, their weight in the overall value added of the urban sector declines as
communication costs fall. This tends to make Northern cities smaller. On the other hand, the overall size of
the urban sector increases, bringing about an increase in overall urbanization. In turn, this increase in the size
of the urban sector benefits all cities, including those of the North. Northern cities may therefore decline in
absolute size in the early periods of globalization. This is consistent with the experience of American cities
during the 1970s, which largely experienced population declines irrespective of their skill endowments (Glaeser
and Ponzetto 2010).
The predictions concerning the first stage of globalization outlined above are broadly consistent with em-
pirical observation. Reductions in communications costs have coincided with the increasing spatial separation
supports the former mechanism: easier access to foreign intermediates and capital goods increases the productivity of domestic
firms (Amiti and Konings 2007; Eaton and Kortum 2001) and allows them to increase the scope of their production (Goldberg,
Khandelwal, Pavnick and Topalova 2009, 2010; Feng, Li and Swenson 2013)
26For the formal expression that gives the threshold Tspec1 check the discussion under the heading Result 7 in Appendix B.
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of management and the production facilities of firms (Kim 1999; Duranton and Puga 2005; Henderson and Ono
2008). They have also contributed to the rise of multinational firms, which can be considered extreme cases of
separation between management and production (Markusen 1995). Furthermore, international economic inte-
gration has been accompanied by developing countries diversifying their economies into increasingly complex
and skill intensive activities. The literature on trade integration and offshoring has related this development
with increased skill premia in the South (Csillag and Koren 2011; Mazumdar and Quispe-Agnoli 2002), the
displacement of unskilled workers in the North, and the increased complexity of the tasks performed by workers
in the North (Ottaviano, Peri and Wright 2013; Lu and Ng 2012). Moreover, a series of recent studies (Schott
2007; Rodrik 2006; Hausmann, Hwang and Rodrik 2007) have built measures of export sophistication across
countries and found a trend of rapidly expanding export sophistication among developing nations.
Finally, as the model predicts, recent globalization has had an uneven impact within countries. A growing
literature has analyzed the impact of trade integration, and in particular import competition, on local economies
within countries and has found asymmetric effects (Autor, Dorn and Hanson 2013; Topalova 2007, 2010; Dauth,
Findeisen and Suedekum 2014; Costa, Garred and Pessoa 2015). Moreover, in developing countries, the eco-
nomic diversification brought about by globalization has also proceeded unevenly. Jarreau and Poncet (2012)
build measures of export sophistication at the sub-national level in China and document not only that China’s
export sophistication has been growing over time, but also that substantial regional disparities in export so-
phistication have emerged and persist within China. They also find that regions that displayed greater export
sophistication have enjoyed more rapid economic growth.
4.2 Full Specialization of the South’s Advanced City
As communication costs continue to decline and a larger fraction of skilled manufacturing shifts to the South,
unskilled manufacturing is gradually crowded out from the leading Southern location S2. Similarly, in the
North, the increased competitiveness of the South in skilled manufacturing coupled with continued growth in
the management services sector leads to the gradual crowding out of skilled manufacturing from the North’s
skilled city N2. As this process unfolds, at some point the skilled city of either the South or the North may
become completely specialized in their country’s more skill intensive activity. Under Assumption 6 this occurs
first in the South, launching the second stage of globalization:
Stage 2: Full Specialization of the South’s Advanced City Along the interval of communication costs
given by Tspec2 < τ ≤ Tspec1 the spatial configuration of economic activity is depicted in Figure 5 27. Any
reduction in communication costs is associated with increased urbanization and worldwide GDP, faster increases
in Southern GDP, growth in the relative size of advanced cities in both countries, skill polarization across
Northern cities and divergence in real estate prices across Southern cities, with skilled cities favored.
During the second stage of globalization, in the North, the margin of adjustment to the international
relocation of skilled manufacturing is still the industrial structure of cities (and implicitly their skill share).
27For the formal expression that gives the threshold Tspec2 check the discussion under the heading Result 8 in Appendix B.
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S1 S2 N1 N2
u s s s,M
Figure 5: Second stage of globalization
However, in the South, this margin of adjustment is exhausted and any further spatial reallocation is reflected
in the relative land prices of the two Southern cities. Thus, skill polarization across space continues in the
North, while divergence in land prices across cities is observed in the South.
This stage of globalization corresponds to the acceleration in growth experienced by manufacturing hubs
in several developing countries, particularly in South East Asia, starting from the 1980s. As the disadvantage
represented by high international communication costs is gradually eroded, developing world cities with access
to good infrastructure and foreign markets are increasingly able to leverage their large pools of cheap labor
to capture market share in advanced manufacturing. As these locations become fully specialized in skilled
manufacturing, their continued attractiveness as production hubs puts upward pressure on rental rates for
land. As a result, this stage of globalization is characterized by the continued divergence of leading Southern
locations relative to their countries, but this time reflected both in faster population growth and in rapid real
estate price appreciation.
4.3 A Pure Management City in the North
If the wage gap between the two countries is wide enough, continued improvements in communication tech-
nologies usher in a new stage of globalization with a fully specialized skilled city also in the North. As the
spatial economy enters this third stage of globalization, another landmark threshold is reached - the threshold
of communication costs at which the ambiguity surrounding the evolution of the absolute size of the skilled
Northern city is eliminated. This is established in the following proposition:
Proposition 5. Along the path defined by unique stable equilibria and for a large enough differential in labor
costs between North and South, (i.e. ξ1Nξ1S large enough), there exists a threshold T̄ , with 1 < T̄ < Tmax such
that for every τ < T̄ , any reduction in τ is associated with growth in the absolute size of the North’s skilled city
N2.
This result can be most easily understood in conjunction with the characterization of the third stage of
globalization:
Stage 3: A Pure Management City in the North Along the interval of communication costs given by
Tovt < τ < Tspec2 the spatial configuration of economic activity is depicted in Figure 6
28. Along this interval,
any reduction in communication costs is associated with increased urbanization and worldwide GDP, faster
increases in Southern GDP, growth in the relative size of advanced cities in both countries, divergence in real
estate prices across cities in both North and South, with relatively skilled cities favored.
During the third phase of globalization the unskilled city of the North is the only location that remains vul-
28The threshold Tovt is defined formally in Result 9 in Appendix B.
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S1 S2 N1 N2
u s s M
Figure 6: Third stage of globalization
nerable to increased competition from the South. As a consequence, it experiences continued relative declines
in population and property prices. Improvements in communication gradually erode the productive advantage
enjoyed by the unskilled Northern city relative to the advanced Southern location, and cause the market share
in skilled manufacturing of the latter to keep increasing. Moreover, the interval of communication costs that






at which city S2’s access
to cheap Southern labor becomes more valuable than location N1’s frictionless access to management. As a
result, below this threshold land rental rates in the South’s skilled city overtake those in the lagging Northern
location N1.
For the skilled Northern location, the onset of the third stage of globalization means that any ambiguity
concerning its absolute population and land price growth is eliminated. Up to this point, reductions in commu-
nication costs had led to two opposing forces that drove changes in the absolute size of the advanced Northern
location: losses of market share in skilled manufacturing and employment growth in the management services
sector. However, at communication costs below Tspec2 the skilled city of the North becomes fully specialized
in management and the first force is no longer operational. This in turn guarantees that the skilled city of the
North grows in absolute terms during the third stage of globalization.
The main feature of the third stage of globalization is that the main margin of adjustment to continued
improvements in communications is given, in both countries, by land prices. As communication costs fall, we
observe divergence in the price of land across cities in both North and South. These developments highlight the
role played by the complementarity between international integration and agglomeration. While the relative
prices of land in both countries’ lagging cities decline sharply and serve as a force encouraging the dispersion
of economic activity in each country, globalization also raises the value of the unique assets of each country’s
advanced city (infrastructure in the South, localization economies in the North). This latter force dominates
and sustains an increasingly uneven economic geography in both North and South.
My discussion of the first three stages of globalization reveals that the model can also account for some
of the finer details of the growth experience of cities in the US and other developed countries. In particular,
it can explain the non-monotonic evolution of cities in many developed countries over the last few decades
(Glaeser and Ponzetto 2010). Around 1970, most US cities, irrespective of their skill endowments, experienced
population declines. By the 1990s skilled cities such as Boston and New York saw sustained economic and
demographic recoveries. In contrast, cities such as Detroit or Buffalo, with unfavorable skill endowments and
industrial specializations, continued to experience sluggish growth and even decline. This pattern of initial
urban decline followed by a differential recovery favoring skilled cities corresponds to the transition between
the second and third stages of globalization in my model.
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4.4 The Future: Urban Overtaking
If the North-South wage gap is sufficiently wide, the continued fall of international communication costs opens
up a novel possibility, that of urban overtaking along global value chains. The loss of skilled manufacturing
in city N1 eventually drives its (relative) rental rates for land sufficiently low such that this location becomes
competitive in unskilled manufacturing (which is relatively land intensive). The skilled city of the South thus
acquires a more skill intensive industrial structure than the unskilled city of the North, and launches a new
stage of globalization.
Proposition 6. Along the path defined by stable equilibria, and for a large enough differential in labor costs
between North and South, there exists a threshold Tovt, with 1 < Tovt < Tmax such that if τ falls below Tovt the
skilled city of the South overtakes the unskilled city of the North along the global supply chain (i.e. S2 has a
more skill intensive industrial structure than N1).
Stage 4: Urban Overtaking Figure 7 depicts the spatial configuration of economic activity when com-
munication costs are in the interval τ∗ < τ < Tovt
29. During this stage of globalization, any reduction in
communication costs is associated with increased urbanization and worldwide GDP, faster increases in South-
ern GDP, growth in the relative size of advanced cities in both countries, divergence in real estate prices across
cities within countries, the de-skilling of city N1 and skill polarization across Northern cities.
S1 N1 S2 N2
u u,s s M
Figure 7: Fourth stage of globalization - urban overtaking
As urban overtaking unfolds, the Northern backward city experiences a trend of de-skilling because it loses
jobs in skilled manufacturing and adds jobs in unskilled production. It also continues its relative decline in
terms of population and real estate prices. This process of de-skilling in city N1 restores the trend of skill
polarization across Northern cities. Urban overtaking also reinforces the divergent paths of Southern cities. As
the unskilled Southern location S1 begins to lose market share in unskilled manufacturing to Northern city N1,
the skilled Southern city continues to capture market share in skilled manufacturing. As a result, changes in
absolute population for city S1 become ambiguous while city S2 continues to grow both in absolute terms and
relative to S1.
While the developments described above are still far from becoming widespread trends, some evidence indi-
cates that urban overtaking is already relevant for the most successful developing world cities. An analysis of
real estate markets reveals that in 2002 lagging US metropolises such as Detroit and leading developing world
cities such as Beijing displayed comparable rental rates for prime office space30. By 2013 a large gap in the
29For the formal expression that gives the threshold τ∗ see Result 10 in Appendix B.
30As in my model land only features on the production side, office space rents are probably conceptually closest to the notion of
rental rates for land in my model.
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price of renting property had appeared between the two cities. Office rents in the Chinese capital rose rapidly
not only to surpass those in Detroit but also rival rents in leading developed-world cities such as New York
and London, while office rents in Detroit declined as the city suffered from the relocation of the automotive
industry. This is all the more remarkable given the impressive supply response of the Beijing office market
in the same period. Additional evidence consistent with urban overtaking is provided by Berry and Glaeser
(2005), who find declines in the skill shares (i.e. deskilling) of a small number of US cities during the 1990s.
Beyond city outcomes, urban overtaking allows my model explain several additional phenomena. One is
that of “reshoring”, which has seen firms in developed countries bring some activities that had been offshored to
developing countries back to their home markets. In an expanded version of my model, this development can be
interpreted as follows. In a first wave of globalization, prohibitive cross-country transportation costs for goods
and services are gradually eliminated while communication costs remain high. As a result, the North loses
its unskilled manufacturing sector while the South loses its (small) management sector and skilled production
sector. This leads to the configuration of economic geography similar described at the start of my analysis (in
Proposition 1), before the onset of second wave (communication induced) globalization. As the first wave of
globalization is exhausted and the second wave of globalization begins, the configuration of the spatial economy
goes trough the stages 1 − 3 described above, and finally enters stage 4, which sees unskilled manufacturing
return to the North to take advantage of cheap land. This generates a pattern of spatial reallocation that may
be described as reshoring.
The model can also account for two additional recent developments in rich country labor markets: the slow-
down in educational attainment growth and labor market polarization. Along the overtaking stage of second
wave globalization, the growth sectors in the North are unskilled manufacturing and management services,
while skilled manufacturing is on the retreat. This can lead to a pattern of labor demand consistent with
labor polarization (i.e. jobs are created in the most and the least skill intensive sectors, but not in middle-skill
occupations) and to a slower growth in skill demand in the North.
Stage 5: Balanced Growth Finally, below τ∗ (i.e. for 1 < τ < τ∗), communication costs no longer impose
a major impediment to the delivery of management services. As a result, worldwide economic geography is
determined by unconstrained comparative advantage. This leads to the onset of Stage 5 of globalization, when
the configuration of the spatial economy is given by cities S1 and N1 specializing in unskilled manufacturing,
city S2 in skilled manufacturing and city N2 in the management function. During this stage of globalization,
reductions in communication costs do not generate further spatial reallocation of activity across cities, which
means that divergence in skill shares and land prices across cities ceases. However, urbanization continues and
communication improvements are associated with proportionate growth in all cities.
5 Conclusion
The past fifty years have seen remarkable changes in worldwide economic geography. While urbanization has
proceeded apace, the experiences of individual cities have recorded a wide array of urban successes and failures.
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This variety in urban performance has been particularly noted in developed countries, where old industrial
cities such as Detroit or Newcastle seem caught in perpetual decline, while other areas such as New York or
London have been successful by reinventing themselves as centers of skill-intensive services. Urban growth hasn’t
been even in developing nations either, as skilled cities such as Bangalore and Shenzen have been particularly
successful in exploiting the opportunities offered by globalization and have grown rapidly.
In this paper I suggest that these developments share the same cause: the spatial re-arrangement of global
value chains resulting from deepening international economic integration. The reduction of (cross-country)
spatial frictions, which I interpret as the result of improved communication, allows increasingly skill-intensive
stages of global value chains, which require substantial managerial oversight, to be carried out in remote
locations, often in developing countries. This leads to improved economic conditions in these countries and
to structural change that draws people from hinterlands to cities. Moreover, the more advanced locations of
these poorer nations benefit disproportionately from the reconfiguration of global value chains. This is because
they can leverage their superior infrastructure to increasingly specialize in more complex activities that can
now be competitively undertaken in the South. In the North, locations that host the activities that face
enhanced competition from developing countries as a result of globalization experience economic stagnation or
even decline. Meanwhile, leading cities of developed countries thrive. This is because they can leverage their
unassailable advantage at delivering the most skill-intensive services by selling to a larger and more integrated
world economy.
My theory can also be employed to cast an eye at the future of cities. Future improvements in communication
technologies will likely continue to hurt old manufacturing cities in the North, while boosting management and
innovation hubs. They will also benefit most Southern urban areas, with a particularly strong effect on locations
that offer conditions appropriate for skilled production. Certainly then, there is every reason to think that
discrepancies in productivity and wealth across cities within countries will continue and even widen further.
Finally, this paper highlights that beyond the common challenges faced by all urban areas, cities also face
particular challenges that relate to their position along global supply chains. For manufacturing cities in
industrialized countries the main challenge is to upgrade to more skill intensive activities and thus mitigate
the impact of foreign competition. For the leading locations of the South the challenge is to continue to
capture more of the skill intensive stages of global production and perhaps eventually compete for the most
advanced managerial and creative activities with the innovation hubs of industrialized countries. Naturally, the
challenge faced by the advanced locations of industrialized nations lies in maintaining their notable productive
advantage in these high skill and high value added activities. All in all, recent trends seem to point towards a
world in which the parameters of the “global race” often mentioned by politicians involve greater competition
between the ever more similar managerial and skilled production hubs of developed and developing nations,
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Figure 1: Cross Country Convergence - Income and Urbanization
Notes: Pane a of the figure shows the population weighted relationship between initial income and income growth over the period 1970
to 2000 for a panel of 112 countries for which data is available. Income levels are measured as GDP per capita in constant 2010 dollars.
Income data is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Population data is obtained from the UN’s World
Population Prospects. Pane b of the figure shows the evolution of urbanization rates over time (1960-2016), for the world as a whole and
for groups of countries defined by income (the country classification by income level is based on 2012 GNI per capita from the World
Bank, while the income thresholds for allocation into groups are those used by the World Bank). The source of the urbanization data is
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(d) Skill Divergence Across Cities - China
Figure 2: Widening Spatial Disparities Within Countries and Human Capital
Notes: Panes a and b of the figure show the relationship between initial skill shares and subsequent urban growth across US and Chinese
cities respectively. The period covered by the data used in both panes a and b is 1990 to 2000. Panes c and d of the figure show the
relationship between initial skill shares and changes in the skill shares for the period 1990 to 2000 across US and Chinese cities respectively.
For the US, skill shares are defined as the share of each city’s population that holds a bachelor degree at the relevant point in time.
For China, skill shares are defined as the share of each city’s population educated to “senior high school”level or higher at the relevant
point in time. Data for the US (used in panes a and c) is obtained from the 5% samples of the 1990 and 2000 US Censuses available via
IPUMS. Data for China is obtained from county level tabulations of the 1990 and 2000 Chinese Censuses. Our baseline samples contain
239 metropolitan areas for the US and 238 urban areas for China. For the purposes of graphical representation, in Pane b urban growth
outliers in the case of China were eliminated without affecting the statistical relationship between skills and urban growth.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Appendix A: Key Assumptions
In this section I provide a rigorous formulation of the parametric restrictions I refer to in section 3.3.
Preliminaries and Clarifications
I begin by showing that, irrespective of the other parameters of a model, a sufficiently large γ can ensure that
the traditional commodity is produced in both countries in equilibrium.
Result 1 For any set of parameters 〈α, β, µ, µ′, ξ1N , ξ1S , θ, ε, LS , LN 〉 and for any localization economies func-
tion φ(.) there exists a threshold value γ such that for any γ > γ it must be the case that any equilibrium
features production of the traditional commodity in both countries.
Proof: From the optimization problem of consumers, the relative expenditures on the two goods (traditional




















































For such a γ∗ it can be shown that any equilibrium will feature traditional production in both countries. This is
because, according to the equation above, such a γ induces equilibrium expenditure shares that are incompatible
with the traditional good being produced in a single country. With relative expenditure shares between the
traditional and the urban good given by the equation above, the concentration of the traditional sector in any
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one of the countries would lead to wages in that country to be pushed to such elevated levels that at least a
fraction of that nations traditional good producers would prefer to deviate to the other country. Also, the same
reasoning implies that for any γ > γ∗ there cannot be an equilibrium in which the entire traditional sector is
hosted in only one country.
Finally, Result 1 is established by denoting γ to be the infimum of the set of γ∗ above, that have the property
that the economy given by
〈α, β, µ, µ′, ξ1N , ξ1S , θ, ε, LS , LN , γ∗〉
and function φ(.) does not allow for an equilibrium in which the traditional commodity is produced in only one
country for any τ ≥ 1.
Formal Statements of Parametric Restrictions
Assumption 1 The North is more productive in the traditional sector and the traditional sector is sufficiently
large such that it is produced in both countries in any equilibrium. We thus assume that:
ξ1N > ξ1S
γ > γ(α, β, µ, µ′, ξ1N , ξ1S , θ, ε, LS , LN )
Assumption 2 The production of management is infeasible in the South. We thus assume that:
ξMS = 0
Assumption 3 I require that localization economies are strong enough to generate clustering of the manage-
ment sector in only one (Northern) city in any stable equilibrium. The function φ(.) governing the strength of
localization economies in the management services sector is thus assumed to have the following properties:
Property 1: φ(0) > 0

















































Assumption 4 I assume that the role of infrastructure in skilled manufacturing (intermediate s) is sufficiently

























Assumption 5 requires that the North-South wage gap is sufficiently large (i.e. ξ1N/ξ1S is sufficiently large)
such that in the absence of communication costs some Southern locations have a comparative advantage in
the completion of skilled manufacturing. In other words we assume that the presence of communication costs
imposes a binding constraint on the production possibilities of the South. In our analysis we maintain two
versions of this assumption (denoted Assumptions 5a and 5b) with one (Assumption 5b) being more restrictive.
These restrictions are presented in greater detail below:
Assumption 5a A necessary condition for the South to be competitive in the production of skilled manufac-
turing (s) in the absence of communication costs. I require that the relative size (in terms of their expenditure














Assumption 5b A stricter version of Assumption 5a which I impose throughout my analysis in order to
explore the full predictive possibilities of the model. I require that the labor cost differential between the two
























By assuming a sufficiently large differential in labor costs between the two nations, I am able to illustrate the
entire range of stages that the configuration of the (worldwide) spatial economy can go through as communica-
tions costs are gradually lowered. Starting from this benchmark analysis it is then straightforward to consider
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cases in which differentials in labor costs (and hence productivity in the traditional sector) are lower, as this
will mean that the configuration of worldwide economic geography will only go through an ordered subset of
the stages described in my analysis.














The parametric assumption above merely affects the “timing” of the stages of specialization the world economy
goes through as communication costs are gradually reduced. It has no bearing on the overall qualitative




In what follows, I proceed to the proofs of the main results reported in the paper. Throughout my analysis I
maintain Assumptions 1 − 6 described above. For the purposes of this section and the rest of the Appendix,
the notions of unskilled manufacturing and intermediate u, skilled manufacturing and intermediate s, and
management (services) or intermediate M are used interchangeably.
Preliminaries: Solving the Model
I begin with the optimization problem of consumers. Given the CES utility function describing consumer prefer-













Furthermore, designating utility as the numeraire yields:
γεp1−ε1 + (1− γ)εp
1−ε
2 = 1 (22)
Moreover, given the perfectly competitive environment that prevails on the supply side of good markets, com-
modities are priced at the cost of production - see (7). In the case of the traditional good, this means that the








where wUc denotes the unskilled wage rate in country c (note that free mobility within countries means that
the unskilled wage is equalized across locations, both rural and urban, within countries). As Assumption 1
guarantees that the traditional good is produced in equilibrium in both N and S, the level of (unskilled) wages
in the two countries is given by (9).









while the expenditures on the requisite stages of production or intermediates involved in production of the
urban good are given by
Yu = θY2 Ys = (1− θ)Y2 (24)
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Moving to the analysis of the supply side of urban intermediates, perfect competition and costless transport








where, as before, cl(i) represents the minimum cost of production of intermediate i (i ∈ {u, s,M}) at location




































where as previously established, wUl , w
S
l represent the unskilled and skilled wages at location (city) l while p
M
l
denotes the price of management services at a location l. Note that wages for workers of a particular skill level
are the same across locations within countries but differ across countries, as established in equation (9).
Concerning the management sector, Assumption 3 guarantees that equilibria in which the entire sector is
clustered in one of the Northern locations exist and are stable. From the demand system of the model I can
then derive a simple expression for the revenues of the management sector:
YM = µ(1− α)(1− θ)Y2
The absence of communication costs in the North means that there is a unique price for management services
across locations within this country. From the supply side of the model I can derive expressions for the price

























where pSM denotes the price of management services in the South (note that Southern locations are subject to
symmetric communication costs when sourcing the management services from the North) while the term 1/φ(1)
reflects the fact that the management is produced with maximal productivity in equilibria featuring complete
agglomeration of the management sector in only one city (N2).
Finally, I focus attention on primary factor markets. Exploiting the demand side of labor markets I obtain






















M = β(1− µ′)YM





Y li = Y2
where, as before, Y2 denotes worldwide expenditure on the urban good.
On the supply side of labor markets, the assumptions of perfect within country mobility of workers, their
frictionless mobility across sectors, as well as the access of all workers to an identical education technology ensure




































Relative wages across countries are fixed by their relative productivity in the traditional sector (Assumption
1) while skill premia in both countries are fixed by the exogenous educational technology. Land prices adjust
such that the demand for land equates the inelastic land supply in each city l ∈ {N1, N2, S1, S2} according to
equation (11).
Finally, when characterizing the evolution of global economic geography, I am particularly interested in
tracking how reductions in international communication costs affect cities’ populations, skill shares and real
estate prices, as well as overall (worldwide) urbanization. While real estate prices in equilibrium are pinned
down by equation (11), the expressions for a city’s equilibrium population and skill share are given by equations
(14) and (15).
Proof of Proposition 1
I proceed by first proving a series of intermediary results.
Result 2 Under the assumptions above, in any equilibrium, S1 must be fully specialized in unskilled manu-
facturing (u).
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The proof proceeds by contradiction. Let us assume that there is an equilibrium in which S1 houses some









which ensures that the cost of the composite given in the first bracket of the cost function of s is always higher

























































Thus, in any such equilibrium, S1 must capture the entire intermediate u production activity. However,
Assumption 4 also ensures that in configurations in which S1 amasses the entire u sector, then city S2 will be
a strictly lower cost location for the production of intermediate s. Thus in such an equilibrium, s cannot be
produced in location S1, leading to a contradiction and the completion of the proof.
Result 3 There cannot be an equilibrium featuring the partial agglomeration of the management sector.
Given that M can only be produced in the North, the only option for equilibria featuring partial agglomeration
of the management sector would imply that one of the Northern cities captures a market share of 12 < x < 1 in
the production of management services. Before the proof proceeds let us establish the following result:
Result 3.1 In any equilibrium involving the incomplete agglomeration of M , the city featuring a market share
x > 12 in management services must be fully specialized in the production of management services.
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Given that we have incomplete specialization (assuming WLOG incomplete agglomeration in N2):




⇒ φ(xN2) > φ(xN1) (33)
It must then be the case that rN1 < rN2 (the cities are identical in every respect and face the same labor
costs). But from the point of view of all the other urban activities, cities N1 and N2 are symmetric so any
firm specializing in any of the other activities would optimally choose to locate in N1 rather than N2. This
establishes result 3.1.
























∀x ∈ [ 1
2
, x] (35)
where the last inequality follows from Result 3.1. But then it must be the case that x∗N2 > x. We have that in



















However the relationship above leads to a contradiction, as the real estate price differential between cities N2
and N1 required by equation (36) cannot be sustained in any equilibrium. In fact it can be shown that in















The contradiction established between the requirements of equations (36) and (37) above complete the proof
of Result 3.
Following Result 3 I have established that any potential equilibrium involves either symmetric cities in the
North (it is straightforward to show that equilibria with x∗N2 =
1
2 always exist) or completely agglomerated
configurations, in which the entire management sector is clustered in one Northern city. In the next result, I
show that there can be only one equilibrium involving complete agglomeration when τ > Tmax.
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there can only be an unique equilibrium (up to a permutation of city labels in the North) in which the
management services sector is fully agglomerated in only one of the Northern cities. The features of this
equilibrium are as described in Proposition 1.
Again, in order to prove the above result, I first need to establish a series of intermediate results. These are
outlined below.
Result 4.1 For τ > Tmax, there cannot be an equilibrium in which activity u is produced in the North.
Proof: Let us assume that we can identify an equilibrium in which u is indeed produced in the North. This
would imply that in such an equilibrium, a location Ni where i ∈ {1, 2} is a cost minimizing location for the














































and given Assumption 4 this implies that:
cN1(s) < cS1(s) (41)
cN1(s) < cS2(s) (42)
which means that in the posited equilibrium, the South cannot be hosting production of any s. Hence this
implies that in such an equilibrium, the South is fully specialized in activity u. But then, due to Assumption
5b it must be the case that the South captures the entire unskilled manufacturing (u) sector, which leads us to
a contradiction with our assumption that there is an equilibrium for τ > Tmax in which u is produced in the
North, and thus concludes the proof.
Result 4.2 For τ > Tmax, there cannot exist an equilibrium featuring complete agglomeration of management
in which s is produced in the South.
Result 1 and result 4.1 mean that there are only two possible configurations left for potential agglomerated
equilibria. One features the South producing activity u and the North producing the entire outputs of urban
sectors s and M , whereas the other possible configuration features the South capturing the entire activity u
but also some market share in intermediate s, while the North retains the complementary market share in s
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and has a monopoly position in the production of management services.
Let us assume that we have identified an equilibrium for τ > Tmax such that s is produced in the South.
Result 2 dictates that any such equilibrium features activity s being undertaken in the South’s “advanced”city
S2. This yields the following:
cS2(s) ≤ cN1(s) (43)
(rS1 + rS2)N = (1− β)θY2 + x(1− β)(1− µ)(1− θ)Y2 (44)
where x above represents the South’s market share in the skilled manufacturing (s) in the posited equilibrium.






Plugging equation (45) into (44) yields











(1− β)θY2 + x(1− β)(1− µ)(1− θ)Y2
N
(47)
On the other hand, in the posited equilibrium it must also be the case that:
(rN1 + rN2)N = (1− x)(1− β)(1− µ)(1− θ)Y2 + µ(1− α)(1− µ′)(1− θ)Y2 (48)
Noting the (ex-ante) symmetric characteristics of Northern cities and restricting (without loss of generality)
attention to configurations in which the complete agglomeration of management occurs in location N2 then I
can write:
rN2 ≥ rN1 (49)
Combining the last two equations I obtain:
rN12N ≤ (1− x)(1− β)(1− µ)(1− θ)Y2 + µ(1− α)(1− µ′)(1− θ)Y2 (50)
which can be rewritten as:
rN1 ≤


























Substituting τ > Tmax into the equation above gives us:
rN1
rS2




On the other hand, dividing equations (51) and (47) yields:
rN1
rS2
≤ (1− x)(1− µ)(1− θ) + µ(1− α)(1− µ
′)(1− θ)
2 K11+K1 [θ + x(1− β)(1− µ)(1− θ)]
(55)
The incompatibility of the inequalities (54) and (55) means that I have reached a contradiction, which completes
the proof of result 4.2.
In light of result 4.2 the only possibility that remains is an equilibrium configuration in which urban sector u
locates exclusively in the South, while M and s locate exclusively in the North. It is straightforward to check
that the configuration described by Proposition 1 is indeed an equilibrium: given that the South completely
specializes in u, it is indeed the lowest cost location for intermediate u production; the North produces man-
agement services and the presence of large (τ > Tmax) communication costs for the international delivery of
management makes production of s uneconomical in the South. The suggested configuration can also be shown
to satisfy the requirements for locational equilibrium within countries. Finally, given that the configuration of
the spatial economy outlined in Proposition 1 was reached via a process of elimination, it must be the case that
this is indeed the only equilibrium featuring asymmetric Northern cities.
Result 5 Symmetric equilibria are never stable in the sense of Definition 2.
Under a symmetric equilibrium, half of the management sector is hosted by each of the Northern cities. This
implies:
cN1(M) = cN2(M) (56)


































i.e. the effect of a disturbance reflected in the partial derivative at the symmetric equilibrium is largest in a
hypothetical scenario in which the North is completely specialized in management services. But property 4 of


























Thus, a locational deviation by a small (but positive) mass of M producers from one of the symmetric Northern
cities in such an equilibrium makes the recipient city more attractive for firms in the management services
sector and less attractive to firms operating in the other urban sectors. This implies that symmetric equilibria
are unstable in the sense of Definition 2.
Result 6 The asymmetric equilibrium configuration outlined in Proposition 1, which features complete clus-
tering of management in city N2 (or city N1) is stable in the sense of Definition 2.
From the analysis of undertaken in the proof of Result 3, I know that moving a small mass ∆x of firms from
N2 to N1 (when the M cluster occurs at N2) will keep N2 as a strictly preferred location for the production
of management services. Moreover, while the disturbance caused by the move of a small mass of management
services firms from N2 to N1 would leave N2 more attractive than N1 in all urban sectors, the pull of the pro-
ductive conditions remaining in N2 would be particularly strong for management services providers, so it can
be shown that the asymmetric equilibrium outlined in Proposition 1 would be restored. Thus, this equilibrium
is stable in the sense of Definition 2.
Finally, combining results 4, 5 and 6 above completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Comparative statics of threshold Tmax
In this section I proceed to analyze the comparative statics of Tmax, the threshold of communication costs
above which skilled manufacturing is uneconomical to undertake in the South, with respect to the structural
parameters of the model. These are summarized in Corrolary 1 below:
Corollary 1. The threshold Tmax, above which the production of the skilled manufacturing (s) in the South is
uneconomical, has the following comparative static properties: ∂Tmax/∂ξ1N > 0, ∂Tmax/∂ξ1S < 0, ∂Tmax/∂θ <
0, ∂Tmax/∂µ < 0, ∂Tmax/∂µ
′ < 0, ∂Tmax/∂A < 0.
In line with economic intuition, increases in the relative price of Northern labor are found to cause increases
of the threshold Tmax (∂Tmax/∂ξ1N > 0, ∂Tmax/∂ξ1S < 0). Raising the relative cost of labor in the North
makes the South more attractive for the production of skilled manufacturing, and hence a higher communication
cost is required to offset this added cost advantage of the South and maintain the entire skilled manufacturing
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sector in the North.
The third result of Corollary 1 (∂Tmax/∂θ < 0), which links the expenditure share of unskilled manufacturing
with the threshold Tmax, is also intuitive. An increase in the size of the unskilled manufacturing sector (and
a converse decrease in the expenditure share of skilled manufacturing) implies that in a configuration of the
spatial economy in which communication costs preclude the South from performing skilled manufacturing (s)
and cause it to capture the entire unskilled manufacturing sector (u), the relative price of Southern land will
be higher.31 This makes the South relatively less attractive to skilled manufacturing firms, and thus a smaller
communication cost is required to maintain the North’s monopoly in s.
The interpretation of the fourth result (∂Tmax/∂µ < 0) is more involved, as an increase in the expenditure
share µ of the “advanced” factors of production (skilled labor and management services) has three effects.
Firstly, it increases the importance of management for the production of skilled manufactures, such that a lower
communication friction can still be sufficient to substantially impair the South’s competitiveness in producing
this commodity. This effect can be expected to lead to a decline in Tmax. Further, an increase in µ tends to
weaken the dispersion force represented by fixed land supplies, as it both tends to reduce land prices and the
importance of land in skilled production. Given that the presence of this dispersion force is the main factor
preventing the concentration of economic activity in the North, a weakening of this mechanism also lowers the
level of communication costs Tmax required to preserve the North’s decisive comparative advantage in skilled
manufacturing. Finally, depending on the relative sizes of α and β, raising µ either makes skilled production
more (if α > β) or less (if α < β) labor intensive. This effect then tends to either increase Tmax if skilled
manufacturing becomes more labor intensive (as in this case the South’s cheap labor advantage is augmented)
or to lower Tmax if it becomes less labor intensive. The first two effects dominate the third irrespective of the
direction of the latter, such that an increase in µ is always associated with a decline in the threshold Tmax.
The effect of a rise in the land expenditure share of management, which is proportional to 1 − µ′, on
the threshold Tmax is straightforward: as the management sector only operates in the North, a rise in the
expenditure of this sector on urban land has the effect of worsening congestion in the North, thus making
this nation less attractive for skilled production. As a result, communication costs affecting the international
delivery of management services need to rise to keep the entire skilled manufacturing sector in the North
(i.e. ∂Tmax/∂(1 − µ′) > 0 ⇒ ∂Tmax/∂µ′ < 0). Similarly, the implications of an increase in the infrastructure
differential between the advanced locations (S2,N1,N2) and the backward one (S1) generated by a rise in A are
clear. As the South hosts the infrastructure poor location, an increase in the productivity differential between
this location and the rest is equivalent to a decline in the relative productive potential of the South overall.
This in turn serves to lower the level of the communication costs required to discourage skilled production in
the South.
31In a configuration like the one outlined in Proposition 1, the relative price of land in the two countries is given by the relative
sizes of the sectors located in each country and their relative land intensities. Then ceteris paribus, an increase in the size of the
unskilled manufacturing sector will increase land prices in the country housing it, namely the South. Assumption 5 ensures that
whenever the South is uncompetitive in skilled manufacturing it can capture the entire unskilled manufacturing sector.
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Proof of Propositions 2 to 6
It is straightforward to see that showing that the spatial economy goes through the configurations described as
stages 1 to 5 of globalization is equivalent to proving the results presented in propositions 2− 6. In this section
I prove a series of results that confirm that the spatial economy evolves according to the history presented in
section 4 and that jointly constitute a proof of the main results of the paper (propositions 2− 6).
Result 7 Along the interval of communication costs given by
{











< τ ≤ Tmax (60)
there is a unique stable equilibrium that involves activity s being produced in locations {S2, N1, N2}, u being
produced in both Southern cities while management (M) is produced in N2. Moreover, along this interval, any
reduction in communication costs is associated with increased urbanization and worldwide GDP, faster increases
in Southern GDP, growth in the relative size of advanced cities in both countries, and skill polarization across
space within countries.
Proof: In this and the following results, I will focus attention on proving the comparative static results. The
proof of the existence and stability of the posited equilibria, as well as their uniqueness within the class of stable
equilibria largely follows the same template as the proof of Proposition 1 undertaken in the previous section. In
order to prove the comparative static results outlined above, I again first need to establish some intermediate
results.
Result 7.1 For τ < Tmax a reduction in communication costs is associated with a decline in the relative price






Along the interval Tspec1 < τ < Tmax the equilibrium configuration outlined above implies that the following
must hold:















cS2(s) = cN1(s) = cN2(s) = ps (61)
cS1(u) = cS2(u) = pu (62)
Further, the equality cN1(s) = cN2(s) embedded in equation (61) above implies that rental rates are equalized
across Northern cities (i.e. rN2 = rN1 = rN ) whereas the equality cS1(u) = cS2(u) implies that rS2 = K1rS1
where K1 = A
β




































































































Undertaking the same procedure of collapsing expressions containing only parameters into constants I obtain




































































Imposing global market clearing conditions on labor and land markets gives us the equations:
LSξ1Sp1 + L
Nξ1Np1 = Y1 + βθY2 + [αµ+ β(1− µ)](1− θ)Y2
+ (1− θ)µ(1− α)[µ′ + β(1− µ′)]Y2
(rS1 + rS2 + rN1 + rN2)N = θ(1− β)Y2 + (1− β)(1− µ)(1− θ)Y2
+ (1− θ)Y2µ(1− α)[(1− β)(1− µ′)]




+ 1 + 2G(τ))N = θ(1− β)Y2 + (1− β)(1− µ)(1− θ)Y2
+ (1− θ)Y2µ(1− α)[(1− β)(1− µ′)] (73)





+ 1 + 2G(τ)







Similarly the price of the traditional good (good 1) is given by the following expression:
p1 =
Y2







+ βθ + (1− θ)[αµ+ β(1− µ)] + µ(1− α)(1− θ)[µ′ + β(1− µ′)]
]
(75)

























+ βθ + (1− θ)[αµ+ β(1− µ)] + µ(1− α)(1− θ)[µ′ + β(1− µ′)]
] (76)























































1−µ +1] = 0 (79)






















+ 1 + 2G(τ)
























]τµ(1−α)(1−θ)[µ(1−α) 1−µ′1−µ +1] (82)
Given that the right hand side of equation (82) is positive the sign of the expression in equation (80) is pinned
down by the sign of the expression in the curly brackets in equation (81). It is straightforward to show that




∂τ > 0 which completes the proof of Result
7.1.
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Result 7.2 For Tspec1 < τ < Tmax, any reduction in international communication costs is associated with an
increase in world output.
Proof: The result above is straightforward and can be obtained by expressing equilibrium output via equation
(6) (the value of total output is equivalent to aggregate utility as we’ve chose utility units as the numeraire),
expanding the expression to obtain an equation expressed in terms of the equilibrium allocations of land and
labor to the production of various commodities, and totally differentiating the resulting expression by making
use of the envelope theorem.
Result 7.3 For Tspec1 < τ < Tmax, any reduction in international communication costs is associated with an





Proof: The result above can be obtained by differentiating equation (21) with respect to τ and noting Result
7.1.
Thus I have so far shown that decreases in international communication costs along the interval Tspec1 <
τ < Tmax are associated with reduction in the relative price of the urban good, growth in world output and
in the expenditure share of the urban good (i.e.τ ↑⇒ p2p1 ↓, Y ↑,
Y2
Y1
↑). In what follows I show that it is also
associated with an increase in the relative size of skilled cities in both North and South (i.e. an increase in the
relative size of S2 and N2 vis-a-vis S1 and N1 respectively).
In a stable equilibrium with Tspec1 < τ < Tmax, it must be the case, in light of the first part of result 7 that
the following conditions hold:
Y S1u + Y
S2
u = Yu = θY2 (83)




s = Ys = (1− θ)Y2 (84)
As I have already established that in equilibrium, along the relevant range of communication costs, rental rates
of the two Northern cities are equalized, I can write:
rN1 = rN2 = rN
(1− β)(1− µ)Y N1s
N
=
(1− β)(1− µ)Y N2s + µ(1− α)(1− β)(1− µ′)Ys
N
where the latter equation can be re-ordered:
Y N2s = Y
N1





In equilibrium I also have that:
rN = G(τ)rs2
(1− β)(1− µ)Y N1s
N
= G(τ)
(1− β)(1− µ)Y S2s + (1− β)Y S2u
N
where again the latter equation can be simplified and re-ordered:
(1− µ)Y N1s = G(τ)[(1− µ)Y S2s + Y S2u ] (86)
Finally, locational equilibrium across Southern cities imposes:
rS2 = K1rS1





where the latter equation can be simplified to:
(1− µ)Y S2s + Y S2u = K1Y S1u (87)









whereas Yu, Ys and Y2 are considered known):

(1− µ)Y N1s = G(τ)[(1− µ)Y S2s + Y S2u ]
(1− µ)Y S2s + Y S2u = K1Y S1u
Y N1s = Y
N2
s + µ(1− α)
1−µ
1−µ′Ys
Y S1u + Y
S2
u = Yu






Solving the system of equations above yields the following expressions of the unknowns as a function of Y2, the




(1− µ) + µ(1− α)(1− µ′) + θ
1−θ
]
[1 + (1 + 2G(τ))K1]
Y2 (89)
Y S2u =
θ[1 + 2G(τ)]K1 − (1− θ)[(1− µ) + µ(1− α)(1− µ′)]





(1 +K1)(1− θ)[(1− µ) + µ(1− α)(1− µ′)]Y2 − 2θK1G(τ)Y2







(1− µ) + µ(1− α)(1− µ′) + θ
1−θ
]







(1− µ)− µ(1− α)(1− µ′) + θ
1−θ
]
− µ(1− α)(1− µ′)(1 +K1)
1 + [1 + 2G(τ)]K1
Y2 (93)
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Y N2M = µ(1− α)(1− θ)Y2 (95)
Where the former equation is equivalent to equation (90). Finally, I am ready to move to the analysis of the
populations of cities, which can be expressed as a ratio of the wage bill of the workers at each location divided






βY S2u + [αµ+ β(1− µ)]Y S2s
ξ1Sp1
(97)
Plugging equations (83) and (93) into equation (97) and simplifying I obtain
PopS2 =
[
α µ1−µ (1 +K1) + βK1
]










α µ1−µ (1 +K1) + βK1
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θ[(1 +K1) + 2K1G(τ)]
(1− θ)
[
(1− θ) + µ(1− α)(1− µ′) + θ1−θ
] (102)








(1− θ) + µ(1− α)(1− µ′) + θ1−θ
]G′(τ) > 0 (103)




∂τ < 0 which proves that along the interval of communication
costs Tspec1 < τ < Tmax, reductions in communication costs are associated with an increase in the relative size
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of the advanced Southern city S2 (i.e. τ ↓⇒ PopS2PopS1 ↑). The proof that the same happens in the North proceeds
analogously:
PopN1 =




[αµ+ β(1− µ)]Y N2s + [µ′ + β(1− µ′)]µ(1− α)(1− θ)Y2
ξ1Np1
(105)
Making use of (88) I can rewrite (105) as follows:
PopN2 =
[αµ+ β(1− µ)]Y N1s + µ(1− α)(1− θ)
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(1− µ)[(1 +K1) + 2K1G(τ)]
K1G(τ)(1− θ)
[
(1− µ) + µ(1− α)(1− µ′) + θ1−θ
] (109)


















Corroborating the result above with equation (108) leads to the conclusion that ∂(PopN2/PopN1)/∂τ < 0
which completes the proof that along the interval of communication costs covered by result 7, a reduction in
communication frictions is associated with an increase in the relative size of the skilled city (city N2) also in
the North.
I am now ready to move to the results concerning worldwide urbanization. From the identity equating the
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income of workers with total labor costs, I can write:
ξ1SL
S + ξ1NL
N = Y1 + βθY2 + [αµ+ β(1− µ)](1− θ)Y2
+ (1− θ)Y2µ(1− α)[µ′ + β(1− µ′)]
Noting that the entire world output is used up remunerating labor and land, I can also write the following
accounting identity for the global remuneration of labor:
ξ1SL
S + ξ1NL
N = Y − θ(1− β)Y2 − (1− β)(1− µ)(1− θ)Y2
− (1− θ)Y2µ(1− α)(1− β)(1− µ′)





Y − (1− β)(1− µ)
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1− (1− β)(1− µ)
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= −(1− β)(1− θ)
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I can now show that decreases in international communication costs are associated with rising world urban-
ization. From equation (91) I can write, in compact form:
Y S2s = f(τ)Ys = f(τ)(1− θ)Y2
Y N1s + Y
N2
s = [1− f(τ)]Ys = [1− f(τ)](1− θ)Y2





[αµ+ β(1− µ)](1− θ)f(τ)Y2
ξ1Sp1
+
[αµ+ β(1− µ)](1− θ)(1− f(θ))Y2
ξ1Np1
+
µ(1− α)(1− θ)[µ′ + β(1− µ′)]Y2
ξ1Np1
(115)







+ [αµ+ β(1− µ)](1− θ)
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[αµ+ β(1− µ)](1− θ)
ξ1Sξ1N
(ξ1N − ξ1S)f ′(τ)<0 < 0 (116)
Which completes the proof that along the interval of interest, reductions in communication costs are re-
lated to increasing in total urban population, and hence urbanization: τ ↓⇒ World Urban Population ↑⇒
World Urbanization ↑. I am finally ready to discuss the issue of skill polarization across space (within coun-







































β(1− µ)Y S2s + βY S2u
(119)





























Where the sign of the RHS of equation (121) is determined by the sign of the last partial derivative. I proceed




(1− µ) {θ[1 + 2G(τ)]K1 − (1− θ)[(1− µ) + µ(1− α)(1− µ′)]}
(1 +K1)(1− θ)
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< 0 which shows that along the interval of communication costs covered by result
7, reductions in communication costs are associated with skill polarization across southern cities. Turning our










However, given that N1 remains completely specialized in activity s along the entire interval of communication



















































β(1− µ) + β(1− µ) YM
Y N2s
(123)






[µ′β(1− µ)− αµβ(1− µ)] ∂∂τ
YM
Y N2s[
β(1− µ) + β(1− µ′) YM
Y N2s
]2 (124)

























(1− µ) + µ(1− α)(1− µ′) + θ1−θ
]
− µ(1− α)(1− µ′) 1+K1G(τ)






which implies that ∂∂τ
HN2
LN2
< 0 which establishes our final statement from result 7 namely that along the
interval of communication costs Tspec1 < τ < Tmax, reductions in communication costs are associated with skill







In what follows I move to establish results for the next range of communication costs, which are described as
stage 2 of (communication induced) globalization.
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Result 8 Along the interval of communication costs given by
{
µ(1− α)(1− µ′)










< τ ≤ Tspec1 (126)
the unique stable equilibrium involves activity s being produced in locations {S2, N1, N2}, u being produced
only in Southern location S1 while management (M) is produced only in N2. Moreover, along this interval,
any reduction in communication costs is associated with increased urbanization and worldwide GDP, faster
increases in Southern GDP, growth in the relative size of advanced cities in both countries, skill polarization
across Northern cities and divergence in real estate prices across Southern cities, with relatively skilled cities
always favored.
Proof: As before, I focus on the comparative static statements contained in Result 8 (proof of existence and
uniqueness of the stable equilibrium configuration described above is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1).
I first need to establish some intermediate results.
Result 8.1 For Tspec2 < τ < Tspec1 a reduction in communication costs is associated with a decline in the






Proof: Similar to Result 7.1.
Result 8.2 For Tspec2 < τ < Tspec1 a reduction in international communication costs is associated with an
increase in world output.
Proof: Similar to Result 7.2.
Result 8.3 For Tspec2 < τ < Tspec1 any reduction in international communication costs is associated with an





Proof: Similar to Result 7.3
I now focus on the statements concerning urbanization and the relative performance of locations within coun-
tries. Along the interval of communication costs covered by Result 8 stable equilibrium configurations are
governed by:















cS2(s) = cN1(s) = cN2(s) = ps (127)
cS1(u) = pu (128)
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Given the configuration of equilibria along this range of communication costs, I can write:
Y S1u = Yu = θY2 (129)
rS1N = (1− β)θY2 (130)
rS2N = (1− β)(1− µ)Y S2s (131)
rN1N = (1− β)(1− µ)Y N1s (132)
rN2N = (1− β)(1− µ)Y N2s + (1− β)(1− µ′)Y N2M (133)
Furthermore, from the equation cS2(s) = cN1(s) I obtain (by expanding and simplifying) the equilibrium
condition:
rN1 = G(τ)rS2 (134)
which given that both locations S2 and N1 are completely specialized in s yields the result:
Y N1s = G(τ)Y
S2
s (135)
From the symmetry of Northern cities, and given that equilibrium configurations in this range of communication
costs involve skilled manufacturing (s) taking place in both Northern cities, it must be the case that rN1 =
rN2 = rN . Coupled with equations (132) and (133) this yields:
Y N1s − Y N2s =
µ(1− α)(1− θ)(1− µ′)
1− µ
Y2 (136)
Finally, for such configurations, we have the “accounting”identity:




s = Ys = (1− θ)Y2 (137)
Solving the system of equations generated by equations (135), (136) and (137) yields:
Y N1s =









(1− θ)Y2 [(1− µ) + µ(1− α)(1− µ′)]
(1− µ) [2G(τ) + 1]
(139)














[αµ+ β(1− µ)]Y S2s
βY S1u
(142)























G′(τ) < 0 (144)
This establishes that decreasing international communication frictions are associated with an increase in the
relative size of the advanced city in the South (i.e τ ↓⇒ PopS2PopS1 ↑). Moving to confirm the same statement for
the North, we have
PopN1 =




[αµ+ β(1− µ)]Y N2s + [µ′ + β(1− µ′)]µ(1− α)(1− θ)Y2
ξ1Np1
(146)
Substituting for Y N2s in (146) from (136), taking the ratio of the two populations (to assess relative size) and




















































= − 1− µ
(1− θ)[(1− µ) + µ(1− α)(1− µ′)]
1
[G(τ)]2
G′(τ) < 0 (149)





< 0 which shows that reductions in communication
costs are also associated with an increase in the relative size of the skilled cities in the North.






= −(1− β)(1− θ)
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I can again express Y S2s as Y
S2




s = [1 − f(τ)]Ys with f ′(τ) > 0. With the above
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[αµ+ β(1− µ)](1− θ)Y2f(τ)
ξ1Sp1
+
[αµ+ β(1− µ)](1− θ)[1− f(θ)]Y2
ξ1Np1
+
µ(1− α)(1− θ)[µ′ + β(1− µ′)]Y2
ξ1Np1
(152)







+ [αµ+ β(1− µ)](1− θ)
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[αµ+ β(1− µ)](1− θ)
ξ1Sξ1N
(ξ1N − ξ1S) f ′(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0 (154)
I conclude that along the interval of communication costs covered by result 8 we have that:
τ ↓⇒World urban population ↑⇒World Urbanization ↑.
Moving to the evolution of the skill compositions of various locations (and in particular to the question of skill



















where the latter result highlights the absence of movements in the relative skill endowments of Southern


















































































which establishes that along the second stage of globalization, skill divergence in the North continues.
Finally, shifting the focus towards urban land markets, it is easy to see that in the North land prices across
cities remain equalized (as they were in the previous stage of globalization) whereas in the South we have:
rS1N = (1− β)τY2











[(1− µ) + µ(1− α)(1− µ′)]
[2G(τ) + 1]
(164)







[(1− µ) + µ(1− α)(1− µ′)]
[2G(τ) + 1]2
2G′(τ) < 0 (165)
Where the last result indicates that along the second stage of globalization, reductions in the cost of commu-
nication are associated with divergence in the rental rates of land across Southern cities, with the advanced
(skilled) city S2 favored (i.e. τ ↓⇒ rS2rS1 ↑).
I now proceed to the third stage of globalization.




















< τ < Tspec2 (166)
the unique stable equilibrium involves activity s being produced in locations {S2, N1}, u being produced only
in Southern location S1 while management (M) is produced only in N2. Moreover, along this interval, any
reduction in communication costs is associated with increased urbanization and worldwide GDP, faster increases
in Southern GDP, growth in the relative size of advanced cities in both countries, divergence in real estate prices
across cities in both North and South, with relatively skilled cities favored as well as absolute growth in the
skilled Northern city N2.
Proof: I focus on the comparative static statements in Result 8. As in Result 7, I first need to establish some
intermediate results.
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Result 9.1 For Tovt < τ < Tspec2 a reduction in communication costs is associated with a decline in the






Proof: Similar to Result 7.1, 8.1.
Result 9.2 For Tovt < τ < Tspec2 a reduction in international communication costs is associated with an
increase in world output.
Proof: Similar to Result 7.2, 8.2.
Result 9.3 For Tovt < τ < Tspec2 any reduction in international communication costs is associated with an





Proof: Similar to Result 7.3, 8.3
I now focus on urbanization and the relative performance of locations within countries. Along the interval of
communication costs covered by Result 9 stable equilibrium configurations are governed by:
rS1N = (1− β)θY2
rS2N = (1− β)(1− µ)Y S2s
rN1N = (1− β)(1− µ)Y N1s
rN2N = (1− β)(1− µ′)Y N2M = µ(1− α)(1− θ)Y2(1− β)(1− µ′)
Y S2s + Y
N1
s = Ys = (1− θ)Y2 (167)
rS2N + rN1N = (1− β)(1− µ)(1− θ)Y
Furthermore, it is still the case that:
rN1 = G(τ)rS2
Y N1s = G(τ)Y
S2
s (168)









whereas the value of output produced at the remaining locations, which are not involved in intermediate s
production is given by:
Y S1u = Yu = θY2
Y N2M = µ(1− α)(1− θ)Y2
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[αµ+ β(1− µ)]Y S2s
ξ1Sp1
(172)























G′(τ) < 0 (174)
which implies that τ ↓⇒ PopS2PopS1 ↑ Similarly for the North I can write:
PopN1 =
[αµ+ β(1− µ)]Y N1s
ξ1Np1
PopN2 =
[µ′ + β(1− µ′)]Y N2M
ξ1Np1
























G′(τ)µ(1− α) < 0 (176)
which implies that along the range of communication costs covered by result 9, any reduction of these communi-
cation costs is associated with an increase in the relative size of the skilled city in the North (i.e. τ ↓⇒ PopN2PopN1 ↑).
Moving on to discuss the statement about urbanization in Result 9, note that I can write Y S2s as Y
S2
s = f(τ)Ys





[αµ+ β(1− µ)](1− θ)Y2f(τ)
ξ1Sp1
+
[αµ+ β(1− µ)](1− θ)[1− f(θ)]Y2
ξ1Np1
+











+ [αµ+ β(1− µ)](1− θ)
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[αµ+ β(1− µ)](1− θ)
ξ1Sξ1N
(ξ1N − ξ1S) f ′(τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0 (179)
where the proof that (τ ↓⇒ p1Y ↓⇒
Y
p1
↑⇒ Y2p1 ↑ (which also establishes the sign of the first partial derivative in
equation 179 above) is identical to the one in Result 7. I can conclude that along the interval of communication
costs covered by result 9 we have that: τ ↓⇒World urban population ↑⇒World Urbanization ↑.
Unlike previous results, Result 9 also contains a statement concerning the changes in the absolute level of
population for the skilled city of the North, city N2, which I prove below:
PopN2 =
[µ′ + β(1− µ′)]Y N2s
ξ1Np1
=
[µ′ + β(1− µ′)]µ(1− α)(1− µ′)Y2
ξ1Np1
(180)















which establishes that reductions in communication costs in the third stage of globalization lead to absolute
growth in the size of the Northern skilled city (i.e. ∂PopN2∂τ < 0 which is equivalent to τ ↓⇒ PopN2 ↑).
Result 9 also implies that along the third stage of globalization we observe a stop of skill divergence across






































Finally, analyzing the movements in the price of land triggered by improving communications:
rS1N = (1− β)θY2 (182)
rS2N = (1− β)(1− µ)Y S2s (183)























G′(τ) < 0 (185)
which implies that τ ↓⇒ rS2rS1 ↑. Shifting focus to the North we have:
rN1N = (1− β)(1− µ)Y N1s
= (1− β)(1− µ)(1− θ) G(τ)
1 +G(τ)
Y2 (186)
rN2 = (1− β)(1− µ′)Y N2M
= (1− β)(1− µ′)µ(1− α)(1− θ)Y2 (187)






















which yields the conclusion that τ ↓⇒ rN2rN1 ↑ which completes the proof of Result 9. A similar approach can be
used to show that along this stage of globlization, rental rates for land rise in absolute terms in three cities -
S1,S2 and N2.

























< τ < Tovt (190)
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the unique stable equilibrium involves activity s being produced in locations {S2, N1}, u being produced in
location S1 in the South and location N1 in the North while management services (M) are produced only in N2.
Moreover, along this interval, any reduction in communication costs is associated with increased urbanization
and worldwide GDP, faster increases in Southern GDP, growth in the relative size of advanced cities in both
countries, divergence in real estate prices across cities in both North and South, with relatively skilled cities
favored, as well as the de-skilling of city N1 and skill polarization across Northern cities.
Proof: As in the previous results I focus on the comparative static statements. I again need to establish some
intermediate results.
Result 10.1 For τ∗ < τ < Tspec2 a reduction in communication costs is associated with a decline in the






Proof: Similar to Result 7.1, 8.1, 9.1.
Result 10.2 For τ∗ < τ < Tspec2 a reduction in international communication costs is associated with an
increase in world output.
Proof: Similar to Result 7.2, 8.2, 9.2.
Result 10.3 For τ∗ < τ < Tspec2 any reduction in international communication costs is associated with an





Proof: Similar to Result 7.3, 8.3, 9.3
I focus on the statements concerning urbanization and the relative performance of locations within countries.
Along the interval of communication costs covered by Result 10 stable equilibria are governed by the following
key equations:
cS1(u) = cN1(u) = pu
cS2(s) = cN1(s) = ps
cN2(M) = pM
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Making use of the above equations, stable equilibria in the fourth stage of globalization can be characterized
by the following system of equations:
Y S1u + Y
N1
u = Yu (191)
Y S2s + Y
N1








rN1 = G(τ)rS2 (194)
rS2N = (1− β)(1− µ)Y S2s (195)
rN1N = (1− β)(1− µ)Y N1s + (1− β)Y N1u (196)
rS1N = (1− β)Y S1u (197)
In the remainder of the proof of Result 10 I proceed analogously with the proofs of results 7 − 9. I first solve
the system of equations defined by equations (191) to (197) in order to find expressions for the value of output
produced at each location:
Y S1u =















































































Noting the I can write Y S2s in compact form as Y
S2
s = f(τ)Ys with f
′(τ) < 0 I rewrite the expressions of the
output produced at each location as follows:
Y S2s = f(τ)Ys (202)
Y N1s = [1− f(τ)]Ys (203)
Y S1u =






















With the above notation I proceed to analyze the statements of Result 10. I first derive expressions for the





































θ + (1− θ)(1− µ)[1− f(τ)]
(208)






< 0 which establishes that reductions in communication costs are associated with increases





















[αµ+ β(1− µ)] (209)
PopN2 =
µ(1− α)(1− θ)Y2[µ′ + β(1− µ′)]
ξ1Np1
(210)




µ(1− α)(1− θ)[µ′ + β(1− µ′)]
CT0βθ + [1− f(τ)](1− θ)















< 0 which implies that along the fourth stage of globalization reductions in communication
costs are associated with increases in the relative size of the skilled city in the North (i.e. τ ↓⇒ PopN2PopN1 ↑)








[αµ+ β(1− µ)]Y S2s
ξ1Sp1
+
[αµ+ β(1− µ)]Y N1s
ξ1Np1
+
[µ′ + β(1− µ′)]Y N2M
ξ1Np1
(212)





























































 < 0 (214)
Which establishes that reductions of communication costs are accompanied by increasing worldwide urbaniza-
tion along the fourth stage of globalization.
The proofs concerning the presence of skill polarization across cities in the North (with city N1 actually
experiencing de-skilling), as well as continued land price divergence across locations in both North and South
are similar to the ones of previous results and are omitted. Furthermore, it can be shown that along the fourth
stage of globalization, reductions in communication costs are guaranteed to be accompanied by growth in the
levels of population in cities S2 and N2, as well as their respective absolute rental rates (proofs available on
request).
Result 11 Along the interval of communication costs given by
1 < τ < τ∗ (215)
the unique stable equilibrium involves activity s being produced in the advanced Southern city S2, u being
produced only in locations S1 and N1, while management services (M) are produced only in N2. Moreover,
along this interval, any reduction in communication costs does not generate any spatial reallocation of activi-
ties across cities, such that divergence in skill shares and land prices across cities cease. However, urbanization
continues, and reductions in communication costs are associated with proportionate growth in all cities (i.e.
the relative size and land prices between any two cities remain constant).
Proof: Similar to Results 7− 10 above. The configuration of the world economy reaches a “costless communi-
cation” steady state, where there are no further reallocation of market share in any sector across locations, and
as such the relative size of cities, their relative rental rates and their skill shares remain constant. However,
reductions in communication costs still affect the urban-rural margin, and as a result urbanization continues,
and the world economy continues to grow. However all cities grow at the same rate.
Results 7− 11 jointly imply that the statements contained in propositions 2− 6 in the main body of the paper
are correct (proof of these results is equivalent to joint proof of propositions 2−6), and also establish that stages
1 to 5 discussed in the main text offer a correct description of the evolution of worldwide economic geography
as international communication costs decline.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Appendix C: Robustness and Generality of Results
In this section I briefly discuss the robustness of the predictions of my theory to changes in modelling specifi-
cation and assumptions. In particular I stress which of the model’s parametric restrictions (outlined in Section
3.3) are crucial for the results obtained and which can be relaxed without notable changes to the predictions
of the model.
Among the restrictions contained within Assumptions 1 to 6, only Assumptions 2, 3 and 5 are essential for
the central results derived in sections 3 and 4. Thus, for the broad predictions of the model to come to pass, I
require that the North is the only country where production of management is feasible, that the management
services sector is subject to agglomeration economies that are sufficiently strong to encourage the clustering of
the entire sector in only one city, and that the productive conditions in the two countries are such that below
a certain threshold of communication costs the South becomes competitive in skilled manufacturing. If these
assumptions are met the model delivers the result that for some interval of international communication costs,
reductions in communication costs are associated with increases in urbanization, North-South convergence and
divergence between cities within countries (in terms of population, land prices and/or skill shares).
However, some of the more detailed predictions of the model also depend on the other parametric restric-
tions. For instance, the theory predicts persistent divergence among Southern cities along the entire path of
international economic integration. This result hinges on Assumption 4 which ensures that infrastructure is
sufficiently important for skilled manufacturing that the infrastructure scarce Southern location S1 never be-
comes a suitable location for this activity. Should this assumption be relaxed, then a phase of urban divergence
across Southern locations of the type described above would be followed by a phase of urban convergence when
the backward Southern city also begins to attract skilled manufacturing. It is important to note that relaxing
Assumption 4 is likely to make the urban divergence results in the North stronger, as any relative increase in
the production possibilities of the South (the elimination of a constraint on city S1 represents such an increase)
expands the scope for it to capture a greater proportion of global value chains, and as a result increases the
vulnerability of the unskilled Northern city to Southern competition.
The remaining parametric restrictions, Assumption 1 and Assumption 6 are imposed in order to improve
tractability (Assumption 1) and keep the analysis parsimonious (Assumption 6). Relaxing the latter assump-
tion is straightforward and can be shown to have no impact on the main results reported in the previous two
sections. Assumption 1 may also be relaxed in an expanded framework. Such a setup would however lose
analytical tractability.
Among the other features of the model, one that is important in underpinning our urbanization growth
result (though not our urban divergence results) is the greater than unity elasticity of substitution between
the traditional and the urban goods in consumption. This assumption represents a simple way of embedding
into the model the realistic feature: as globalization and development proceed, a greater fraction of worldwide
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expenditure is spent on urban goods. An alternative way of implementing the same feature would have been
the introduction of non-homothetic preferences. With non-homothetic preferences and the designation of the
urban good as the “advanced good” globalization leads to an increase in the expenditure share of urban goods
because it increases income levels.
Finally, while in this paper I have focused on the role of communication technologies, the theory is amenable
to substantial generalization. Thus, under the condition that some essential assumptions of the model are main-
tained (i.e. the ranking of sectors by skill intensity and by the strength of agglomeration/localization economies
match or are strongly positively correlated; the North has comparative advantage in the production of skill
intensive activities) any mechanism that leads to the relocation of some “middle skill”activities from the North
(where they represent the least skilled pre-globalization activities) to the South (where they in turn represent
the most skilled activities), can produce similar results. Alternative mechanisms that can produce the type of
North-South relocation of production stages present in my model include North-South technological transfer,
North-South capital mobility, FDI or Southern TFP growth due to institutional reforms.
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Appendix D: Specialization in Management (or International Com-
merce) and Urban Success in the North
My model explains the divergence of urban fortunes in developed countries by the specialization of skill abundant
cities in management and other activities that stand to benefit from greater international economic integra-
tion. As communication costs decline, all developed world locations become relatively less attractive for skilled
manufacturing activities. However, by specializing in skill-intensive services (such as management), in which
industrialized nations maintain an overwhelming comparative advantage, the skilled cities of the global North
benefit from a compensating force: the ability to sell these advanced services to a bigger and more efficient
world economy.
In this section I provide some suggestive evidence in support of this mechanism. Pane a of Figure 8 shows
the relationship between initial specialization in management (in the year 1980) and subsequent city growth
across a panel of 239 US metropolitan areas32. The figure reveals a strong (and statistically significant) positive






.05 .1 .15 .2
City Management Share 1980
Population Growth 1980-2000 Fitted values






.02 .04 .06 .08 .1
City Employment Share in International Commerce 1980
Population Growth 1980-2000 Fitted values
(b) Specialization in “International Commerce” and City
Growth - US
Figure 8: Economic Specialization and Urban Divergence
Notes: Pane a of the figure shows the relationship between initial (year 1980) specialization in management and subsequent (1980 to
2000) urban growth across US cities. Specialization in management is defined as the share of each city’s population whose occupations are
defined as “Managerial and Professional Specialty Occupations” according to a modified version of the 1990 Census Bureau occupational
classification scheme. Pane b of the figure shows the relationship between initial (year 1980) specialization in “international commerce”and
subsequent (1980 to 2000) urban growth across US cities. Specialization in “international commerce”is defined as the share of each city’s
population whose sectoral affiliation as per the 1990 Census Bureau industrial classification scheme is listed as “Finance, Insurance
and Real Estate”, “Computer and Data Processing Services”, “Business Services”, “Research, development, and testing services” or
“Management and public relations services”. Data is obtained from the 5% samples of the 1980, 1990 and 2000 US Censuses available
via IPUMS. Our baseline sample contains 239 US metropolitan areas.
Pane b of Figure 8 undertakes a similar exercise by relating city growth to initial (year 1980) specialization
32Specialization in management is defined as the share of each city’s population whose occupations are defined as “Managerial
and Professional Specialty Occupations” according to a modified version of the 1990 Census Bureau occupational classification
scheme. Results are robust to alternative (narrower) definitions of specialization in management. Additional results based on
these alternative definitions are available on request.
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in “international commerce”(taken to mean activities such as finance, insurance and real estate; R&D and
management). Again, a strong positive association is observed, which provides further support for the claim











.05 .1 .15 .2
City Management Share 1980
Change City Management Share 1980-2000 Fitted values







.02 .04 .06 .08 .1
City Employment Share in International Commerce 1980
Change Emp Share in Intl Commerce 1980-2000 Fitted values
(b) Deepening Specialization in “International Commerce”
- US
Figure 9: Contribution of Management/ “International Commerce”to Urban Growth
Notes: Pane a of the figure shows the relationship between initial (year 1980) specialization in management and subsequent (1980 to 2000)
change in the extent of specialization in management. Specialization in management is defined as the share of each city’s population
whose occupations are defined as “Managerial and Professional Specialty Occupations” according to a modified version of the 1990
Census Bureau occupational classification scheme. Pane b of the figure shows the relationship between initial (year 1980) specialization
in “international commerce”and subsequent (1980 to 2000) change in the extent of specialization in “international commerce”across US
cities. Specialization in “international commerce”is defined as the share of each city’s population whose sectoral affiliation as per the
1990 Census Bureau industrial classification scheme is listed as “Finance, Insurance and Real Estate”, “Computer and Data Processing
Services”, “Business Services”, “Research, development, and testing services” or “Management and public relations services”. Data is
obtained from the 5% samples of the 1980, 1990 and 2000 US Censuses available via IPUMS. Our baseline sample contains 239 US
metropolitan areas.
Aside from predicting that Northern cities specialized in skilled services (such as management or interna-
tional commerce) grow more rapidly than cities specialized in other activities, my model also predicts that
these skilled activities are the main drivers of that growth. In what follows, I aim to provide some empirical
support for this prediction. In particular, I relate initial specialization in skilled services to subsequent changes
in the extent to which cities are specialized in these activities. Intuitively, if we can show that the (growing)
cities that are initially specialized in management tend to deepen this specialization over time, this would imply
that the management (or “international commerce”) sector in these cities grows even faster than the cities as
a whole and thus represents an important driver of urban growth.
Figure 9 displays the results of this exercise. Pane a shows the relationship between US cities initial (year
1980) specialization in management and the change in the share of the population employed in management
between 1980 and 2000. A strong positive relationship is observed, which is consistent with the view that US
cities initially specialized in management grew faster over the period 1980 to 2000 partially because of the rapid
growth of the management sector itself.
Pane a of Figure 9 displays the results of the same exercise when the variable of interest is specialization
in “international commerce”(defined as activities including finance, management and R&D). Again a positive
(albeit weaker) and statistically significant relationship is found between initial specialization in “international
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commerce” and the change in the proportion of a city’s population employed in “international commerce”
activities. This is consistent with the view that US cities initially specialized in “international commerce” grew
faster over the period 1980 to 2000 partially because of the rapid growth of “international commerce” activities
themselves.
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